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MEMBER STATE INFLUENCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NEIGHBOURHOOD, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INSTRUMENT (NDICI)

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Foreword by EBA

The European Union (EU) is Sweden's most important foreign and development policy partner. The EU is a global political and economic actor as well as the largest foreign aid donor. The EU also represents an important policy arena, where member states try to influence EU development policy, and through it, global development and international relations.

After three years of negotiations, a new long-term EU budget (2021–2027) was agreed upon in 2021. An important part of the budget is the *Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument* (NDICI), which covers the EU's development cooperation with most third countries. These negotiations thus represent one of the most impactful development policy processes of the past decade.

In this study, Magnus Lundgren, Jonas Tallberg and Camilla Pedersen, provide a unique insight into the negotiations. Based on unique data, they describe all positions presented by the member states throughout the negotiations. They then describe how those positions translated into the end results of the negotiation – and thus how successful, or influential, member states were.

I hope that the report will be useful not only in Swedish efforts to prepare for future negotiations, and Sweden's EU presidency in 2023. The study also provides insights into EU development policy, EU negotiations and policy priorities of all member states that might inform all involved in the EU cooperation.

The study has been conducted with support from a reference group chaired by Torgny Holmgren, a member of EBA. The authors are solely responsible for the report and its conclusions.

Gothenburg, November 2022

Helena Lindholm

Sammanfattning

NDICI-Global Europe är Europeiska unionens ramverk för grannskapspolitik, utvecklingspolitik och internationellt samarbete. Ramverket antogs i juni 2021 efter tre år av intensiva förhandlingar mellan medlemsländerna i rådet och ett antal EU-institutioner. Det representerar en betydande översyn av EU:s utvecklingsarkitektur, och integrerar flera tidigare program i ett samlat instrument med en total budget på cirka 80 miljarder euro för perioden 2021–2027.

Denna studie av förhandlingarna som ledde fram till NDICI-Global Europe erbjuder en unik möjlighet att få kunskap om den dynamik som formar inriktningen av EU:s utvecklingssamarbete. Rapporten belyser tre nyckelteman:

- EU:s medlemsländers och institutioners *ståndpunkter* i de frågor som förhandlas samt de *koalitioner* som bildats mellan aktörer.
- EU:s medlemsländers och institutioners *framgång* i förhandlingarna, övergripande och i specifika frågor.
- De *källor till inflytande* som bidrog till framgång i förhandlingarna.

Rapporten är baserad på unika data om förhandlingsfrågor, ståndpunkter och resultat i NDICI-förhandlingarna. Genom samarbete med Utrikesdepartementet fick författarna tillgång till handlingar från samtliga 99 möten i rådets arbetsgrupp för NDICI, där förhandlingarna ägde rum. Utrikesdepartementets dokumentation ger en detaljerad sammanfattning av varje möte med information om vilka medlemsländer som fört fram vilka ståndpunkter i vilka frågor. Med hjälp av statistisk analys uppskattar vi därefter framgången för alla aktörer när det gäller att nå sina önskade resultat i de frågor som förhandlas. Samtidigt som rapporten täcker alla EU:s medlemsländer och nyckelinstitutioner, ägnar den särskild uppmärksamhet åt Sveriges roll i förhandlingarna.

Huvudsakliga resultat

1. *Medlemsstaterna var i varierande grad engagerade i förhandlingarna om NDICI.* Vissa medlemsländer var särskilt aktiva och tog ställning i de flesta förhandlingsfrågor: Irland, Frankrike, Luxemburg, Belgien, Danmark, Sverige och Nederländerna. Till denna grupp hör flera små eller medelstora länder som traditionellt tillhör gruppen ambitiösa givare. Analysen indikerar ett starkt, positivt samband mellan ett lands ekonomiska engagemang för utveckling och dess positionstagande i förhandlingarna.

   Sverige passar väl in i detta mönster, eftersom det är den mest generösa givaren och ett av de länder som har flest positioner i förhandlingarna. Liknande mönster framträder när man analyserar antalet ståndpunktsuttalanden som gjorts av medlemsländerna samt i vilken ordning ståndpunkterna uttrycktes. Sammantaget är de länder som gick med i EU 2004 eller senare väl representerade bland de medlemsländer som tar en mindre aktiv roll i förhandlingarna.

2. *Medlemsstaterna var i förhandlingarna uppdelade utifrån två huvudsakliga konfliktdimensioner.* Den första dimensionen berör frågor om distribution, om man skulle prioritera minst utvecklade länder (LDCs) eller medelinkomstländer (MICs) och om man skulle göra fattigdomsbekämpning till det primära målet. Den andra dimensionen rör frågor om värderingar, till exempel om man skulle inkludera mål relaterade till klimat, migration och jämställdhet. Medlemsstaterna intog olika ståndpunkter i dessa två dimensioner, vilket ledde till distinkta grupper av likasinnade länder.

   Sverige tillhörde den grupp länder som förespråkade mer resurser till de minst utvecklade länderna och fokus på fattigdomsbekämpning, och som också hade progressiva ståndpunkter i frågor som rör klimat, migration och jämställdhet. Sett till alla frågor i förhandlingarna var de medlemsländer som tenderade att ligga närmast Sveriges positioner Belgien, Finland,

Tyskland, Irland och Luxemburg. Omvänt var de medlemsländer som tenderade att vara längst bort från Sveriges positioner Bulgarien, Kroatien, Ungern, Rumänien och Slovakien.

3. *Framgång i förhandlingarna var relativt jämnt fördelad mellan medlemsländerna och EU-institutionerna.* Ingen stat eller överstatlig aktör framträdde som en tydlig vinnare eller förlorare i dessa förhandlingar. Men inom denna större kompromiss finns det vissa tydliga skillnader mellan grupper av medlemsländer. I genomsnitt var traditionella givare i norra Europa mer framgångsrika när det gäller att uppnå sina preferenser. Omvänt hade de flesta östeuropeiska länder relativt låga förhandlingsframgångar. Inget av EU:s två dominerande medlemsländer – Frankrike och Tyskland – fick särskilt höga poäng i fråga om framgång i förhandlingar. Det kan dock inte uteslutas att de utövade ytterligare inflytande genom att påverka kommissionens förslag innan det lades fram. Både kommissionen och parlamentet nådde genomsnittliga framgångar i förhandlingarna.

   Sverige rankas bland de mest framgångsrika länderna i NDICI-förhandlingarna, särskilt när vi tar hänsyn till de frågor som Sverige hade identifierat som prioriterade. Sverige vann viktiga segrar i flera frågor, inklusive lagstiftning som rör jämställdhet och fattigdomsbekämpning.

4. *Framgång i NDICI-förhandlingarna baserades främst på medlemsländers engagemang för utveckling, deras ansträngningar att övertyga andra parter vid förhandlingsbordet samt om landet innehade ordförandeskapet.* Länder som är större biståndsgivare lyckades omsätta detta finansiella åtagande till större tyngd vid förhandlingsbordet. Medlemsstater som gjort större ansträngningar för att övertyga andra parter genom att vara mer engagerade i förhandlingarna var dessutom mer framgångsrika i att nå sina mål. Slutligen, länder som innehade det roterande ordförandeskapet under förhandlingarna gynnades av denna position, vilket gjorde det möjligt för dem att

sätta sin speciella prägel på resultaten. Att lägga sig mot mitten av olika förslag eller att anpassa sig till kommissionen översattes också till en större genomsnittlig framgång.

Däremot var flera källor till inflytande som ofta framhävs i andra sammanhang inte av systematisk betydelse i NDICI-förhandlingarna: medlemsländernas strukturella makt, i termer av ekonomisk storlek och befolkningsstorlek; medlemsstaternas rösträtt i rådet; och medlemsländernas nätverkskapital, i termer av hur uppskattade de är som koalitionspartner i EU-politiken överlag.

Slutsatser inför framtida förhandlingar

Resultaten i rapporten har betydelse för hur medlemsländerna i allmänhet bör navigera i förhandlingar om EU:s utvecklingssamarbete. Dessutom innebär var och en av dessa implikationer särskilda lärdomar för Sverige.

- *Var engagerad genom att ta och förespråka positioner.* Att ta ställning i förhandlingsfrågor gör det möjligt att sätta ramarna för förhandlingarna, att forma riktningen för överläggningarna, att gå samman med likasinnade och att skapa möjligheter till kompromisser och utbyten. På samma sätt hjälper det att engagera sig under förhandlingarna genom att göra upprepade uttalanden för att signalera vikten av en fråga, att övertyga andra parter om värdet av en position och att se till att ens intressen beaktas i resolutionen av frågan. Att inte utveckla och förespråka en ståndpunkt är däremot en politisk ”walk-over”.

  För Sverige var aktivitet och engagemang en viktig källa till inflytande i förhandlingarna, vilket pekar på fördelarna med denna strategi framöver. Sverige var bland de sex främsta medlemsländerna när det kom till att formulera ståndpunkter, och Sverige var näst efter Frankrike när det gäller aktivitet i förhandlingarna. Även om det generellt sett är mer krävande för

en liten eller medelstor stat som Sverige att utveckla den kompetens och de resurser som krävs för att kunna vara aktiva i ett brett spektrum av frågor, lönar sig sådana investeringar i förhandlingar.

- *Bygg koalitioner med likasinnade stater och institutioner*. Genom att gå samman i koalitioner kan medlemsländer kombinera sin respektive förhandlingsmakt och uppnå resultat som är mer gynnsamma än vad som kunde ha uppnåtts av varje stat enskilt. I de flesta EU-förhandlingar handlar det om att bygga en vinnande majoritet bakom ett förslag eller en blockerande minoritet emot. Även om det har sina fördelar att tillhöra institutionaliserade koalitioner, är det viktigt att inse att statliga preferenser tenderar att vara problemspecifika och det därför krävs flexibilitet i uppbyggnaden av likasinnade koalitioner. Som framgår av NDICI-förhandlingarna, samexisterar ofta breda och allmänna konfliktdimensioner med mer unika ståndpunkter i specifika frågor.

  För Sveriges del pekade förhandlingarna på en huvudgrupp av likasinnade länder, vars ståndpunkter överensstämde med Sveriges i de flesta frågor: Belgien, Finland, Tyskland, Irland och Luxemburg. Länderna i denna grupp av stora och etablerade nordeuropeiska givare tenderar att förespråka prioritering av de minst utvecklade länderna och fattigdomsbekämpning, samt progressiva ställningstaganden kring klimat, jämställdhet och migration. Det är anmärkningsvärt att denna grupp är bredare än Sveriges konventionella nordiska partner inom utvecklingssamarbete, vilket tyder på nya viktiga partner i framtida EU-förhandlingar.

  Utöver denna grupp finns det flera länder som anslöt sig till Sverige i specifika frågor, vilket pekar på möjligheten att skapa icke-konventionella koalitioner. Dessutom har Sverige mycket att vinna på att samarbeta med kommissionen och EU-parlamentet i geografiska och tematiska frågor, där de överstatliga institutionernas preferenser liknar Sveriges, till skillnad från i budget- och, framför allt, styrningsfrågor.

- *Få inflytande genom sakspecifik kompetens.* Medan strukturell makt intar en framträdande roll i det offentliga samtalet om statligt inflytande, kommer den sällan starkt fram i akademiska analyser av förhandlingsframgång. Istället, vilket framgår av NDICI-förhandlingarna, får länder ofta inflytande genom sin sakspecifika kompetens – deras engagemang för, erfarenhet av och expertis inom ett visst policyområde. När det gäller NDICI översattes medlemsländernas ekonomiska engagemang för utvecklingssamarbete till inflytande vid förhandlingsbordet. Länder som investerar mer i bistånd i förhållande till sin ekonomi och som utvecklat större expertis inom området kunde skörda frukterna av detta engagemang genom större framgångar i förhandlingarna.

  För Sverige är dessa resultat goda nyheter, eftersom Sverige och andra små eller medelstora länder har begränsad strukturell makt men kan få inflytande genom att utveckla och använda sin sakspecifika kompetens. Som ett av flera nordeuropeiska givarländer med svag strukturell makt men ett starkt engagemang för bistånd och utveckling, kunde Sverige därför få ett större inflytande i NDICI-förhandlingarna än små länder normalt får. Den svenska förvaltningens expertis, och särskilt Sveriges arbetsgruppsföreträdare, har framhållits som en viktig källa till inflytande. Och medan Sverige tillhörde gruppen av finanspolitiskt försiktiga medlemsländer i de övergripande förhandlingarna om EU:s nya långtidsbudget, verkar denna ståndpunkt inte ha hämmat dess förmåga att forma riktningen för NDICI.

- *Se ordförandeskapet som en källa till inflytande.* Även om det ofta sägs att länder som innehar EU:s roterande ordförandeskap måste offra sina egna intressen, underskattar man då ordförandeskapens potential att forma dagordningar och därmed förhandlingsresultat. Som framgår av NDICI-förhandlingarna har länder som innehaft ordförandeskapet tillgång till procedur- och informationsresurser som gör det möjligt för dem att knyta

ihop kompromisser i tvistefrågor, samtidigt som de utövar särskilt inflytande över förutsättningarna. I synnerhet har ordförandeskapet ett visst spelrum att utforma avtal på grund av sin ställning som rådets företrädare i förhållande till parlamentet. Att utnyttja det manöverutrymmet för att styra kompromisser i en viss riktning får sällan större lovord, men är en accepterad del av ett system där varje medlemsland behöver sätta prägel på EU-politiken under sin period vid rodret.

För Sverige, som tillträder ordförandeskapet den 1 januari 2023, understryker resultatet av NDICI-förhandlingarna den roll ordförandeskapet kan ha, inte bara för att utveckla EU-omfattande kompromisser om utvecklingspolitik, utan också för att utforma villkoren för dessa kompromisser. Även om den strategiska inriktningen för EU:s utvecklingssamarbete har fastställts av avtalet om NDICI-Global Europe, kan det svenska ordförandeskapet ha en roll att spela i rådets arbete med att övervaka genomförandet av detta omfattande policypaket. Som ordförande kan Sverige få ytterligare trovärdighet genom sitt ekonomiska engagemang och sin expertis inom utvecklingssamarbetet.

Summary

NDICI-Global Europe is the European Union's framework for neighbourhood policy, development policy, and international cooperation. This new framework was agreed in June 2021 following three years of intense negotiations among the member states in the Council and between the EU institutions. The new framework presents a significant overhaul of the EU's development architecture, integrating multiple programs into one instrument with a total budget of around €80 billion over the period 2021–2027.

The negotiations leading to the adoption of NDICI-Global Europe present a unique opportunity to gain insight into the dynamics shaping the orientation of EU development cooperation. To this end, the report examines three key themes:

- the *positions* taken by EU member states and institutions on the issues under negotiations, as well as the *coalitions* formed among actors
- the *bargaining success* of EU member states and institutions in these negotiations, overall and on specific issues
- the *sources of influence* that contributed to these patterns of bargaining success in the NDICI negotiations.

The report is based on unique data on the issues, positions, and outcomes of the NDICI negotiations. Through cooperation with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), the authors were given access to meeting documentation from all 99 meetings of the Council's Ad Hoc Working Party on NDICI, where the negotiations took place. The MFA documentation provides a detailed summary of each meeting with indications of which member states advanced what positions on what issues. Using statistical analysis, the report subsequently estimates the success of all actors in reaching their preferred outcomes on the issues under negotiation. While the report covers all EU member states and key institutions, it devotes special attention to the role of Sweden in the negotiation of NDICI-Global Europe.

Principal findings

1. *Member states were varyingly engaged in the negotiations on NDICI.* Some member states were particularly active, taking positions on most issues of negotiation: Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands. This group includes several small or medium-sized countries traditionally belonging to the group of ambitious donors. The analysis indicates a strong, positive relationship between a country's financial commitment to development and position-taking in the negotiations.

   Sweden fits this pattern well, being the most generous donor and one of the countries with most positions in the negotiations. Similar patterns emerge when analysing the number of position statements made by member states in the negotiations as well as the order in which positions were expressed. Overall, the countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later are well-represented among those member states taking a less active role in the negotiations.

2. *Member states were divided along two key dimensions of conflict in the negotiations.* The first dimension captured issues of distribution, such as whether to prioritize Least Developed Countries (LDC) or Middle-Income Countries (MIC) and whether to make poverty eradication the primary objective. The second dimension captured issues of value conflict, such as whether to include goals related to climate, migration, and gender. Member states took varying positions on these two dimensions, leading to distinct groups of likeminded countries.

   Sweden belonged to the group of countries that advocated more resources to LDCs and poverty eradication, and that also held progressive positions on issues related to climate, migration, and gender. Across all issues in the NDICI negotiations, the member states that tended to be closest to the positions of Sweden were Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg.

Conversely, the member states that tended to be furthest away from the positions of Sweden were Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.

3. *Bargaining success in the negotiations was relatively evenly distributed across member states and EU institutions.* No state or supranational actor emerged as a distinct winner or loser in these negotiations taken as a whole. However, within this larger compromise, there were some identifiable differences between categories of member states. On average, traditional donors in Northern Europe were more successful in attaining their preferences. Conversely, most Eastern European countries had relatively low bargaining success. Neither of the EU's two dominant member states – France and Germany – scored very high in terms of bargaining success. It cannot however be excluded that they exerted additional influence by shaping the Commission's proposal before it was tabled. Similarly, both the Commission and the Parliament attained average bargaining success.

   Sweden ranks among the most successful countries in the NDICI negotiations, especially when we take the salience of issues into account. Sweden scored important victories on several issues it had identified as priorities going into the negotiation, including legislation relating to gender equality and poverty eradication.

4. *Bargaining success in the NDICI negotiations was driven primarily by a member state's commitment to development, its efforts to persuade other parties at the negotiating table, and its access to the office of the Presidency.* Countries that provide a larger portion of their incomes as ODA managed to translate this financial commitment into greater weight at the negotiation table. In addition, member states that made greater efforts at persuading other parties by being more engaged in the negotiations were also more successful in attaining their objectives. Finally, countries holding the rotating Presidency during the NDICI negotiations profited from this position, which allowed them to put their particular imprint on

the outcomes. Holding a centrist position or aligning with the Commission also translated into greater average success. In contrast, several commonly highlighted sources of influence were not of systematic importance in the NDICI negotiations: member states' structural power, in terms of economic and population size; member states' voting power in the Council; and member states' network capital, in terms of how appreciated they are as coalition partners in EU politics overall.

Policy implications

The findings of the report suggest a number of implications for how member states in general should navigate in negotiations on EU development cooperation. In addition, each of these implications involves particular lessons for Sweden.

- *Be engaged by taking and advocating positions.* Taking positions on the issues of negotiation makes it possible to set the parameters of the negotiations, to shape the direction of the deliberations, to join forces with likeminded parties, and to create opportunities for compromises and exchanges. Similarly, being engaged over the course of the negotiations by making repeated statements helps to signal the importance of this issue to a member state, to persuade other parties of the value of a position, and to make sure that one's interests are considered in the resolution of this issue. In contrast, not developing and advocating a position amounts to political walk-over.

  For Sweden, being active and engaged was an important source of influence in the NDICI negotiations, pointing to the benefits of this approach going forward. Sweden was among the top six member states in terms of position adoption, and it was second only to France in terms of position statements in the negotiations. While it is generally more demanding for a small or

medium-sized state like Sweden to develop the expertise and resources necessary to be engaged across a broad range of issues, such investments pay off in negotiations.

- *Build coalitions with likeminded states and institutions.* By joining forces in coalitions, member states can pool bargaining power and achieve outcomes that are more favourable than what could have been achieved by each state individually. In most EU negotiations, it is a matter of building a winning majority behind a proposal or a blocking minority against a proposal. While belonging to institutionalized coalitions has its advantages, it is crucial to recognize that state preferences tend to be issue-specific and thus demand flexibility in the building of likeminded coalitions. As evidenced by the NDICI negotiations, broad and general dimensions of conflict between groups of member states often coexist with more unique alignments on specific issues.

  For Sweden, the NDICI negotiations pointed to a principal group of likeminded countries, whose positions aligned with those of Sweden on most issues: Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg. The countries in this group of large and established Northern donors tend to advocate prioritizing the least developed countries and poverty eradication, as well as progressive positions on climate, gender, and migration. It is notable that this group is broader than Sweden's conventional Nordic partners on development cooperation, suggesting new important likeminded partners.

  Beyond this group, there are several countries that align with Sweden on specific issues, suggesting possibilities for non-conventional coalitions. In addition, Sweden has much to benefit from cooperating with the Commission and the Parliament on geographic and thematic issues, where the supranational institutions hold preferences close to Sweden's, while the situation is different on budgetary and, especially, governance issues.

- *Gain influence through issue-specific power*. While structural power assumes a prominent role in public discourse about state influence, it rarely comes out strongly in academic analyses of bargaining success. Instead, as shown by the NDICI negotiations, countries often gain influence by way of their issue-specific power – their commitment to, experience of, and expertise within a particular policy domain. In the case of NDICI, member states' financial commitment to development cooperation translated into influence at the bargaining table. Countries that invest more in development relative to their economy and have developed greater expertise in this area as a result, could reap the rewards of this commitment through greater bargaining success.

  For Sweden, these findings are good news, since Sweden and other small or medium-sized countries possess limited structural power but may gain influence by developing and deploying their issue-specific power. As one of several Northern donor countries with weak structural power but a strong commitment to development, Sweden was able to punch above its weight in the NDICI negotiations. In this context, the expertise brought to the table by the Swedish government in general, and its working party representative in particular, was frequently cited as a source of influence. And while Sweden belonged to the group of fiscally cautious member states in the overall negotiations on the EU's new long-term budget, this position does not appear to have hampered its ability to shape the direction of NDICI.

- *Acknowledge the Presidency as a source of power*. While it is often stated that countries holding the rotating Presidency need to sacrifice their own interests for the greater good, such descriptions underestimate the potential for Presidencies to shape agendas and outcomes. As shown in the NDICI negotiations, countries holding the Presidency have access to procedural and informational resources that may allow them to stitch together

compromises on contentious issues, while also exerting special influence over the conditions. In particular, the Presidency enjoys some leeway to shape agreements because of its position as the Council's representative in relation to the Parliament. Exploiting that room for manoeuvre to nudge compromises in a particular direction seldom causes celebration but is an accepted part of a system in which each member state needs to make its imprint on EU politics during its period at the helm.

For Sweden, which assumes the Presidency on January 1, 2023, the NDICI negotiations underline the role the Presidency may have, not only in developing EU wide compromises on development policy, but also in shaping the terms of those compromises. While the strategic orientation of EU development cooperation has been set by the agreement on NDICI-Global Europe in 2021, the Swedish Presidency may have a role to play in the Council's work to oversee the implementation of this extensive policy package. As Presidency, Sweden may gain additional credibility from its financial commitment and prior expertise in the area of development cooperation.

List of Abbreviations

DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EFD	European Development Fund
EFSD	European Fund for Sustainable Development
EU	European Union
GNI	Gross National Income
ICSP	Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace
LDC	Least-developed country
MIC	Middle-income country
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet)
MFF	Multi-annual Financial Framework
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals

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1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) and its member states together constitute the world's largest donor of development assistance, contributing about half of global foreign aid (OECD 2021). Development cooperation is one key component of the EU's ambition as a global political actor, next to international trade, foreign direct investment, and foreign and security policy, as well as EU commitments in areas such as climate change and sustainable development.

Yet as the EU's ambitions of external action have grown, so has the plethora of programs and initiatives by which it seeks to advance its interests and values. This proliferation of financing instruments has raised concerns of incoherence, inflexibility, and inefficiency at a time when the EU needs to respond more effectively to external challenges and needs.

This was the backdrop of the European Commission's proposal in 2018 to replace many existing programs and initiatives for external action with a new coherent framework: the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). NDICI would constitute a significant overhaul of EU policy by combining a variety of external action programs into one financial framework with a total budget of around €80 billion over the period 2021–2027.

Specifically, NDICI would consist of three central components: (1) a geographic component, involving programs for the European neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas and the Caribbean; (2) a thematic component, involving world-wide programs devoted to human rights and democracy, civil-society organizations, stability and peace, and global challenges; and (3) a rapid response component, allowing for quick EU responses in areas such as conflict prevention, state resilience, and foreign policy generally.

The Commission's proposal for a regulation establishing NDICI became the starting point for an intense three-year negotiating process among the member states in the Council and between the EU institutions. Formally, NDICI was negotiated as part of the EU's new long-term budget for the period 2021–2027. In practice, member state negotiations on the substance of NDICI took place in an ad hoc Council working group set up specifically for this purpose. Over the course of the negotiations, this group held a total of 99 meetings. NDICI was politically agreed in December 2020, and the regulation was formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in June 2021.

As the EU's largest donor state in terms of official development assistance (ODA) by gross national income (GNI), but also one of the member states in the fiscally cautious "Frugal Four" coalition, Sweden had clear and strong interests in the negotiation of NDICI. Notably, Sweden prioritized budget restrictions, gender equality and climate considerations, attention to the least developed countries, and the neighbourhood policy (Faktapromemoria 2017/18:FPM158).

1.1 Purpose

The NDICI negotiations present a unique opportunity to gain insight into the influence of EU member states over the orientation and funding of European external action. Through the NDICI process, the EU member states and institutions revealed their interests regarding the long-term direction of European neighbourhood, development, and international cooperation policy, formed coalitions with likeminded parties, and bargained to achieve their preferred outcomes. As such, the NDICI negotiations can provide a rare glimpse into crucial issues of importance for Swedish development policy in a European context:

- What are central dividing lines among EU member states and institutions on Europe's role in the world?
- Which member states broadly share Sweden's preferences about how cooperation in this area should develop, and which member states take contrarian positions?
- How influential was Sweden and other member states in the negotiation of this fundamental reform and large-scale financial package, which sets the direction for EU policy in years to come?
- What factors make member states more or less influential in negotiations over EU development cooperation?
- What lessons can be drawn from the NDICI negotiations for Sweden's upcoming EU presidency in 2023?

The purpose of this report is to shed light on these issues through a systematic analysis of member state positions and coalitions, patterns of bargaining success, and sources of influence across the full range of the NDICI negotiations.

1.2 Method and data

To measure influence in the NDICI negotiations, we use a preference attainment model to analyse unique quantitative data on the positions of all EU member states and key institutions in the NDICI negotiations.

The **preference attainment model** has become an established approach to gauge bargaining success in research on multilateral negotiations in the EU and other institutional fora. Early versions of the model (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994) were developed conceptually and methodologically via the Decision-Making in the European Union (DEU I and II) projects (Thomson et al. 2006; Thomson et al. 2012). The model has been successfully applied in empirical analyses of negotiations in the EU (e.g., Bailer 2004; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Lundgren et al. 2019) and the United Nations (UN) (e.g., Weiler 2012).

The preference attainment model measures an actor's influence on a given issue based on how well it achieves what it set out to achieve – in other words, how closely the collectively agreed outcome overlaps with the actor's initial position. Actors are viewed as more influential if the negotiated outcome is close to their initial position and as less influential if it is distant. The preference attainment model requires data on the contested issues in a negotiation, the initial positions of actors on each issue, and the final negotiated outcomes.

The analysis for this report is based on **unique data** on the issues, positions, and outcomes of the NDICI negotiations. Through cooperation with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), we were given access to MFA reports from the 99 meetings of the Council's Ad Hoc Working Party on NDICI, MFA meeting instructions for the same meetings, and MFA overview reports relating to the negotiations. Secondary sources include MFA memos for the Swedish Parliament, EU documentation, and analyses and reports by EU-related think tanks.

The main source of data are the MFA reports from the 99 meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Party – the core body for the substantive negotiation of NDICI. These reports provide a detailed summary of the deliberations at each meeting with clear indications of which member states advanced what positions on what issue. Each report is five to ten pages in length, follows the chronological structure of the meeting, and is authored by the same representative. Based on these reports, we have (i) mapped the universe of contested issues in the NDICI negotiations, (ii) identified the alternative positions on each issue on a scale from 0 to 100, and (iii) coded the positions of member states and EU institutions on each issue on this scale. In addition, we have identified and coded the final outcome on each issue on the same scale.

The nature of the main source material may raise concerns of bias in the recording of country positions. It may be that Swedish diplomats focus their reports on Swedish priorities and provide a view of negotiations filtered through Swedish interests. However, in our

assessment, the risk of bias should be limited. First, we have reduced this risk by validating our coding of country positions with five external experts with excellent overview of the NDICI negotiating process, institutionally affiliated with the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Finnish Presidency, and the German Presidency. Second, Swedish officials reporting from the meetings should have no incentives to falsely convey the positions of other member states to the MFA, since those are used to formulate Swedish bargaining strategies. Third, the Swedish reports from the 99 meetings are time stamped, excluding the possibility that the recorded positions could have been adjusted retroactively to fit the ultimate outcomes. Fourth, the findings from this report in several respects match results from other research on positions, coalitions, and influence in EU negotiations and development cooperation, lending them further credibility.

1.3 Overview of the NDICI Negotiations

The negotiations on NDICI formally started with the European Commission tabling its proposal for a new regulation in June 2018 (European Commission 2018). Following three years of negotiations between the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council, the regulation was finally adopted in June 2021 (EU 2021). In the final version, the new instrument was renamed NDICI-Global Europe.

In practice, the NDICI negotiations were embedded within two larger processes. The first was a longer process among the member states and the EU institutions on the direction of the EU's policies regarding international cooperation, development, and the European Neighbourhood. Only a year before the NDICI negotiations started had the EU's member states and institutions committed to the 2017 European Consensus on Development, which set out over-arching aims, cross-cutting perspectives, thematic focal points, and a distribution of responsibilities. Similarly, the

European Neighbourhood Policy had in 2015 been reformed in light of a comprehensive review, which brought changes to this framework of cooperation with countries in the EU's vicinity. As the EU's member states and institutions embarked on the NDICI negotiations, they did so against the backdrop of previous debates and reforms, and with some awareness of each other's preferences and priorities. As is common, they also likely sought to influence the Commission's proposal for NDICI before it was tabled.

The second larger process was the negotiation of the EU's new long-term budget – or multi-annual financial framework (MFF) – for the period 2021–2027. The Commission's proposal for the new MFF was tabled in May 2018 and then followed by legislative proposals for 37 sectoral programs, of which NDICI was one. In July 2020, the European Council reached a political agreement on the new long-term budget, and in December 2020, it was formally adopted by the Council and the Parliament. The embedding of the NDICI negotiations within this larger financial negotiation meant that certain framework conditions for NDICI, such as its overall volume, were decided at a higher level and thus not subject to bargaining within the Ad Hoc Working Party on NDICI.

The main purpose of the proposed new NDICI regulation was to establish a new coherent financing architecture for the EU's relationships with partner countries, which previously had been deemed to suffer from fragmentation. By establishing one overall instrument for development cooperation, the EU's funding structure would become more efficient, flexible, and transparent, allowing the EU to better uphold and promote its key values and interests in the world.

Specifically, NDICI would replace and merge ten previous external financial instruments and programs used by the EU between 2014 and 2020. These included the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP),

the Partnership Instrument (PI), the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), and the off-budget European Development Fund (EFD) (European Commission 2022).

Table 1. Timeline of the NDICI negotiations

14 June 2018	European Commission presents its proposal for a regulation establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)
4 July 2018	Council Ad Hoc Working Party on NDICI holds its first meeting
27 March 2019	European Parliament adopts its first-reading position
13 June 2019	Council adopts a partial mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament
25 September 2019	Council adopts an additional mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament relating to the EFSD+
23 October 2019	Trialogue negotiations start between the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission
21 July 2020	European Council agrees on the total budget for NDICI
18 September 2020	Council agrees on a revised mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament
15 December 2020	Political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the final package
9 June 2021	Regulation establishing NDICI-Global Europe adopted by the European Parliament and the Council

The negotiations on NDICI took place at three nested levels. First, NDICI was part of the general negotiations on the EU's new long-term budget for 2021–2027. These negotiations covered all aspects of the next MFF, including the overall budget and the spending levels for all areas of EU policy. These negotiations were

primarily conducted between representatives of finance ministries and prime ministers' offices, with key interventions and decisions by heads of state and government at meetings of the European Council. With respect to NDICI specifically, these negotiations decided on the total budget for NDICI, as well as the overall sums allocated to the three main pillars of NDICI (see below).

Second, NDICI was negotiated at a detailed level in the Council's Ad Hoc Working Party on the MFF Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (AH WP – MFF NDICI). Because of its integrative ambition, NDICI did not fit within the mandate of a pre-existing Council working group, and the member states therefore decided to create an ad hoc working party specifically for the negotiation of NDICI. This working party was the core forum for the negotiation of the substantive contents of NDICI. Following a very intense negotiation schedule, it met 99 times over a period of three years. The provisional agreements from this group formed the basis for the Council's negotiating positions vis-à-vis the European Parliament.

Third, NDICI was negotiated in trialogues between the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission in order to thrash out a compromise between the two co-legislators on the new regulation. These negotiations occurred in a first round in the fall of 2019 and spring of 2020, following internal agreements on negotiating mandates in the two institutions, and in a second and more intense round in the fall of 2020, eventually leading to a political agreement in December 2020. In these negotiations, the Council was represented by the member state holding the rotating presidency and the Parliament by the rapporteurs responsible for the NDICI portfolio.

Particularly controversial issues in the negotiations on NDICI were:

- the integration of the European Neighbourhood Instrument into NDICI
- the integration of the European Development Fund into NDICI

- the establishment of migration, gender, and climate change as cross-cutting priorities for NDICI, and the scope of these priorities
- the governance of NDICI through delegated acts.

1.4 Summary of NDICI-Global Europe

The final agreed regulation establishing NDICI-Global Europe allocates a total of €79.46 billion over the period 2021–2027 to the new instrument (European Commission 2021). This sum covers cooperation with all third countries outside the EU, except for pre-accession countries and overseas countries and territories, which are not covered by the NDICI – Global Europe's geographic pillar but subject to specific instruments. This sum represents a three percent increase compared to the amounts allocated in the previous long-term budget to the instruments now consolidated in NDICI (ECDPM 2022). The total long-term budget for 2021–2027 amounts to €1.074 trillion, excluding the recovery package NextGenerationEU.

The instrument is intended to contribute to the EU achieving its international commitments and objectives, in particular the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Agenda 2030, and the Paris Agreement.

NDICI – Global Europe is divided into three pillars:

A **geographic pillar**, which funds cooperation with third countries, divided into specific regional programs:

- Neighbourhood (at least €19.32 billion)
- Sub-Saharan Africa (at least €29.18 billion)
- Asia and the Pacific (€8.49 billion)
- Americas and the Caribbean (€3.39 billion)

A **thematic pillar,** which funds specific thematic programs:

- Human rights and democracy (€1.36 billion)
- Civil society organizations (€1.36 billion)
- Peace, stability, and conflict prevention (€0.91 billion)
- Global challenges (€2.73 billion)

A **rapid-response pillar**, which funds EU rapid response actions in situations of crisis and conflict (€3.18 billion).

In addition, NDICI – Global Europe includes a **flexibility cushion** of unallocated funds amounting to €9.53 billion to allow the EU to deal with unforeseen circumstances, emerging challenges, and new priorities.

The new instrument also contains an **investment framework** financed from the geographic pillar intended to raise additional financial resources from the public and private sector. This investment framework consists of two parts: the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD+) and the External Action Guarantee.

NDICI – Global Europe further establishes a set of **cross-cutting priorities** to be strengthened through horizontal targets:

- A spending target of 30 percent to step up efforts on climate change.
- A spending target of indicatively 10 percent to tackle the management and governance of migration and forced displacement.
- At least 85 percent of actions should have gender equality as a principal or significant objective.
- At least 93 percent of the funding should be reportable as ODA.

- A spending target of at least 20 percent of the ODA funded under the instrument for social inclusion and human development.
- The EU will continue to aim at meeting its target to commit 0.7 percent of its collective GDP in ODA and at least 0.2 percent to least developed countries (LDCs).

1.5 Research on EU Negotiations

Previous research on bargaining and decision-making in the EU offers insights and expectations that are important to consider when analysing the negotiations on NDICI. In the following, we identify key conclusions from previous research in the three areas covered by this report: positions and coalitions, bargaining success, and sources of influence.

Coalitions are a hallmark of negotiations in the EU. By joining forces in coalitions, member states may pool bargaining power and achieve outcomes that are more favourable than what could have been achieved by each state individually. Coalitions in the EU mainly come in two forms (Tallberg 2008; ECFR 2020). The first type are the traditional country groupings, such as the Franco-German alliance, the Benelux, the Nordic-Baltic Six, and the Visegrad states. These groupings are characterized by their long-term nature, high level of institutionalization, and anchoring in historical experiences, cultural affinities, and geographical proximities. The second type are the issue-specific coalitions that are formed in respect of particular dossiers, such as the "Frugal Four" on EU fiscal matters. These coalitions bring together likeminded states on a specific dossier and are characterized by their issue specificity, lower degree of institutionalization, and higher level of fluidity.

Taken together, these types of coalitions give rise to patterns of cooperation between member states in the EU, manifested in overlapping negotiating positions, informal political contacts, and

similar voting records. Studies of EU negotiations in general have established that such cooperation tends to follow a North-South-East pattern in the aggregate (Mattila 2008; Naurin and Lindahl 2008; Plechanovovà 2011). While specific coalitions on individual issues may diverge from this pattern, a consideration of all issues taken together results in clear geographic clustering, likely reflecting commonalities in interests, identities, and ideas.

This pattern is also observable in the area of development policy, where earlier research tends to distinguish between the EU's most ambitious and progressive donors in the North and the EU's new and emerging donors in the East (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014; Delputte et al. 2016; Szent-Iványi and Kugiel 2020; Karlsson and Tallberg 2021). While the former tends to contribute high levels of ODA, prioritize the least developed countries, and emphasize gender and environmental standards, the latter tend to contribute less funding, prioritize countries in their geographical vicinity, and privilege geopolitics over progressive values.

Bargaining success refers to whether states get what they want in EU negotiations. When member states negotiate new policy initiatives, their ultimate aim is to arrive at decisions that are as close to their preferred outcomes as possible. While it is a widespread perception among both practitioners and researchers that the EU's larger member states are particularly successful in getting the outcomes they prefer, empirical research tends to suggest otherwise.

Numerous studies show that average bargaining success in the EU is quite evenly distributed between the member states (Bailer 2004; Slapin 2006; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Lundgren et al. 2019). Large member states are not generally more able to reach the decisions they prefer than small and medium-sized member states, which often punch above their weight in EU negotiations. A recent study of the negotiations on Eurozone reform even showed smaller member states to have greater bargaining success than larger member states (Lundgren et al. 2019). While there are no clear winners or losers in EU negotiations in the aggregate, the bargaining success of member states on individual dossiers certainly varies.

Earlier research tends to find that Sweden enjoys more bargaining success than most member states in the EU. Several studies of EU decision-making during the first decade of the 2000s find that Sweden was the most influential member state of all on the issues examined (Arregui and Thomson 2006; Cross 2013). In the more recent reform of the Eurozone, Sweden came in fifth in terms bargaining success (Lundgren et al. 2019). Qualitative research suggests that Sweden has been particularly influential on dossiers to which it attaches special importance and on which it holds particular expertise, such as gender equality, environmental protection, employment policy, and international trade (Tallberg and von Sydow 2018).

Identifying the sources of influence that lead to bargaining success is a key concern in research on EU negotiations. Existing literature examines a variety of such potential sources, among them: structural power anchored in superior capabilities, issue-specific power linked to expertise and commitment on particular issues, voting strength according to applicable decision-making procedures, coalitions with other member states, proximity to the European Commission and the European Parliament, and holding the rotating Presidency of the Council.

As suggested by the aggregate patterns of bargaining success, studies find limited support for the expectation that member states' structural power, as also expressed in voting power, is a prominent source of influence. Instead, research tends to find that member states achieve greater bargaining success when they hold less extreme negotiating positions and when their positions are more aligned with those of the European Commission and the European Parliament, while the evidence is mixed for positive effects of the salience a member state attaches to an issue, the extent to which it is an appreciated coalition partner, and whether it holds the rotating Presidency (Tallberg 2006; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Cross 2013; Lundgren et al. 2019).

1.6 Structure of the Report

The organization of the report reflects the three central themes identified in this introduction.

In Chapter 2, we map the positions taken by EU member states and institutions on the issues negotiated as part of the NDICI package, and we identify the extent to which these positions cluster in distinct coalitions of likeminded actors.

In Chapter 3, we identify the bargaining success of EU member states and institutions, in the aggregate and on specific issues of the NDICI negotiations.

In Chapter 4, we present findings on what sources of influence contributed to bargaining success in the NDIC negotiations.

Chapters 2–4 discuss general patterns and findings for EU27, while also devoting special attention to the role of Sweden in the negotiation of NDICI.

We end the report with a brief concluding chapter that summarizes the findings and identifies implications for policy and research.

2 Positions and Coalitions

Core components of any bargaining process are the positions that actors adopt on the issues under negotiation and the coalitions they form with likeminded actors to influence outcomes. What were the key patterns of the NDICI negotiations in this respect? Which member states were most engaged in the negotiations, taking positions on most contested issues, and which member states were least engaged, largely leaving the terms of agreement for others to decide? What were the main lines of division among the member states? To what extent did coalitions shift depending on the types of issues negotiated? In this chapter, we map the positions taken by EU member states and institutions on the issues negotiated as part of the NDICI package, and we identify the extent to which these positions cluster in distinct coalitions of likeminded actors.

2.1 Coding of issues and positions

To identify and analyse the positions adopted by member states and EU institutions in the NDICI negotiations, we developed a novel dataset based on detailed MFA reports from the 99 meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Party, complemented by several validation interviews. This material allowed us to (i) map the universe of contested issues in the NDICI negotiations, (ii) identify the alternative positions on each issue on a scale from 0 to 100, and (iii) code the positions of member states and EU institutions on each issue on this scale. The coding procedures are further described in Section A1 of the Appendix.

We identified the 55 most contested issues in the negotiations conducted by the Ad Hoc Working Party. These issues were contested in the sense of member states taking competing positions on the issue, thus making it a topic of negotiation. Thematically, these 55 issues were divided into five main clusters. The first three

clusters correspond to the main pillars of NDICI while the fourth pertains to the governance of NDICI and the fifth to other budgetary issues:

- GEO: Geographic pillar
- THEM: Thematic pillar
- RAP: Rapid response pillar
- GOV: Governance
- BUDG: Other budgetary issues

Within each of the five categories, policy issues were numbered, starting from 1, to construct a unique issue identifier code, e.g., GOV1 for the negotiations on delegated acts, THEM12 for negotiations on the allocation of funds for civil society organizations, and BUDG4 for negotiations on whether the European Development Fund (EDF) should be included in the NDICI instrument. A full list of issues is provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.

For each of the 55 issues, we identified positions based on the statements made by member states and EU institutions during the negotiations, while outcomes were recorded based on the adopted NDICI regulation text. All positions (and outcomes) assume a value ranging from 0 to 100. If only two conflicting positions emerged in the negotiations, they were coded as 0 and 100 respectively. For example, in the negotiations on whether to integrate the European Neighbourhood Initiative (ENI) into NDICI (GEO2), two positions emerged in the negotiation: states arguing that ENI should remain outside NDICI (assigned to position 0) and states arguing that ENI should be integrated into NDICI (assigned to position 100). If more than two conflicting positions emerged, they were assigned values that as far as possible reflected the assessed distance between the positions. For example, if three conflicting positions exist that are in favour of earmarking 0 percent, 10 percent, or 50 percent to a certain policy area, they would be coded 0, 20 and 100, respectively.

In our coding, we also recorded how many times a member state or institution voiced a particular position, based on the number of times it was reported in the MFA meeting reports.

2.2 Positions in the NDICI Negotiations

To what extent did the 27 member states of the EU take positions on the contested issues in the NDICI negotiations? Adopting and announcing a position signals an ambition to try to shape the outcome of the negotiations on this issue. Figure 1 below reveals significant variation across member states in the extent to which they were actively engaged in the negotiations by stating and explaining their positions. We include states that stated a position on an issue at least once and leave the Commission, whose positions are recorded on the basis of its initial legislative proposal, aside for the time being.

Figure 1. Number of adopted positions, by member state



Note: The total number of contested issues was 55, which thus constitutes the maximum number of issues on which states could adopt positions. Country codes explained in Table A3.

No member state adopted a position on all 55 contested issues. However, a group of nine member states adopted positions on at least 30 contested issues: Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, and Hungary, in descending order. This group includes several small or medium-sized countries traditionally belonging to the group of ambitious donors, as well as a major country with strong interests in EU external relations, and two Central and Eastern European countries with clear positions on many of the issues under negotiation. It is notable that Germany, as the largest and possibly most influential member state in the EU, does not belong to this group of highly engaged countries.

At the other end of the spectrum, three member states adopted positions on fewer than 20 issues: Cyprus, Romania, and Croatia. Generally, the countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later are well-represented among those member states adopting relatively fewer positions in the negotiations. Among the ten member states adopting the lowest number of positions, most joined the EU in 2004 or later. This pattern ties in with descriptions in earlier research of the EU's member states in Central and Eastern Europe as new and emerging donors, which have yet to become as fully engaged in EU development cooperation.

Figure 2 below provides a closer look at one of the likely drivers behind this pattern of engagement in the negotiations: a country's financial commitment to development, as measured by ODA/GNI. We select 2018 data from OECD and World Bank to avoid that ODA/GNI values are influenced by the studied negotiations. It shows a strong, positive correlation ($r=0.53$, $p<0.01$) between ODA/GNI and position-taking in the negotiations, indicating that larger donors also tended to be more active in the NDICI process. Sweden fits this pattern quite well, being the most generous donor and one of the countries with most positions in the negotiations.

Figure 2. Number of positions, by ODA (% of GNI; 2018 data)



When member states diverge from the overall pattern, it is typically by adopting more positions in the negotiations than would be predicted based on their level of ODA. Countries in this category include Ireland, France, and Belgium, which took positions on most issues despite more modest levels of ODA, but also countries like Hungary and Poland in the large group of Central and East European Countries with lower levels of ODA.

An alternative way of capturing a member state's engagement in the negotiations is to consider how frequently it made statements about its positions. Negotiations are partly about persuasion. Expressing and explaining a position many times is a way of both signalling the importance of this issue to a member state and trying to convince others of the appropriateness of this position.

Figure 3 below ranks the member states in terms of the number of position statements made over the course of the negotiations, as recorded in the reports from the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Party. The pattern conforms quite well with the ranking shown in Figure 1 on the adoption of positions. Yet there are some interesting differences in the internal ordering of the member states that were most active. France comes out as the member state most frequently making its positions known in the negotiations, followed by Sweden, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Poland. While Germany advances somewhat in the ranking compared to Figure 1, it remains outside the group of the most active member states.

Figure 3. Number of position statements, by member state



Next to the frequency of position statements, the order in which positions are stated may influence the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations. Taking a position on an issue early in the game is a way of setting the parameters of the negotiation and signalling an intention to shape its resolution. Conversely, adopting a position late in the process may indicate a strategy to take in all arguments before taking a stance or a less intense interest in the issue at stake.

Figure 4 below ranks the member states in terms of the average order in which they took positions on the 55 negotiated issues. It shows that France not only was the member state making most position statements but also the country first out the door, on average, in terms of staking out its positions. Other countries that tended to make their positions known early in the negotiations were Ireland, Slovenia, Hungary, and Belgium. The differences between these countries and the median country, Estonia, are statistically significant ($p<0.05$).

Figure 4. Average order of adopting position, by member state



At the opposite end we find Austria, Cyprus, Malta, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, which tended to express their positions on issues later than all other member states. This group overlaps significantly with the countries adopting fewer positions (Figure 1) and stating those positions less frequently (Figure 3), possibly indicating a lower level of interest in the NDICI negotiations overall.

A potentially more surprising pattern is the relatively late adoption of positions by some of the countries most engaged in the negotiations (Figures 1 and 3) and with the highest levels of ODA (Figure 2):

Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. One interpretation would be that these member states sought to shape the development of the negotiations by weighing in later in the process, once all arguments were on the table and most positions were known. Another and perhaps more likely interpretation would be that they sought to be engaged across a very broad spectrum of issues, but as small or medium-sized states had to be selective in terms of which issues to push early in the negotiations, leaving other issues for later.

Finally, the data on positions are helpful in identifying which issues, among the 55, that were more or less contested in the negotiations. Issues that attract many position statements from member states can reasonably be considered more contested than issues subject to only few position statements.

Figure 5 lists all issues covered in the negotiations by way of the number of position statements (for a list of all issues, see Appendix).

Figure 5. Number of position statements, by issue



It suggests that a group of seven issues were clearly the most contested:

- *Gender equality*: Whether and in which wording to include language on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) in the NDICI (THEM18).
- *Country priority:* The balance between least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries (MICs) in NDICI (GEO13).
- *European preference:* Whether to include language on a European preference relating to implementing partners, goods and/or as a general principle in the regulation (GOV3).
- *Gender equality:* How much of the total allocation of funds under NDICI that should be marked with the OECD-DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker (G-marker) I or II (THEM19).
- *Migration:* Whether the funding target or earmarking for migration should be placed in a recital or in an article of the regulation (THEM7).
- *Incentive-based approach:* Whether the incentive-based approach, established in Article 20 of the final NDICI regulation, should apply only to the Neighbourhood or as a principle for financial allocation beyond the Neighbourhood as well (GOV4).
- *Neighbourhood:* Whether to integrate the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) into the NDICI or whether the ENI should remain a separate instrument outside the NDICI (GEO2).

This shortlist suggests that three types of issues attracted most attention in the NDICI negotiations: thematic issues invoking value conflict (gender equality, migration), geographic issues pertaining to priorities (LDCs vs MICs, ENI), and governance issues (European preference, incentive-based approach). Plotting the number of recorded positions by issue yields largely similar results (Figure A1 in the Appendix).

Interviews suggest that additional governance issues, pertaining to delegated acts (GOV1) and member states' strategic influence (GOV2), were hotly debated toward the end of the negotiations (Commission official 1; Commission official 2; European Parliament official; German Government official; Swedish Government official). However, these issues primarily pitted the member states in the Council versus the European Parliament, and thus did not involve the level of conflict among member states to make it into this shortlist of most contested issues.

A pattern across all three measures of position-taking are the different approaches of France and Germany to the negotiations. France appears to have been the most active member state of all, taking positions on most issues, making those positions known early, and repeating its positions frequently. Germany, by comparison, was less active in the negotiations, adopting positions on fewer issues, coming in later in the game, and being less insistent. These differences between the EU's two largest member states are also a recurring theme in interviews. France was "always very dedicated," according to a German Government official. Similarly, a Commission official attests: "They always speak and they never give up." Germany, in contrast, followed a different approach: "We were OK with the [Commission] proposal, so we did not have any strong points" (German Government official). One possibility, suggested by this quote, is that Germany had succeeded well in shaping the Commission's proposal at the pre-negotiation stage and therefore had less reason to play an active role in the actual negotiations.

We now turn to how these positions coalesced into lines of division and groupings of likeminded states in the NDICI negotiations.

2.3 Coalitions in the NDICI Negotiations

What were the main conflict lines in the negotiations, and which states advanced likeminded positions, thus forming de facto coalitions? To explore these issues, we examined the substance of

the positions advanced by member states in the negotiations. For each of the 55 contested issues, we established the full spectrum of potential positions and coded the specific position of each individual member state. When aggregated, these data allow us to uncover the principal dimensions of conflict in the negotiations as a whole, but also the positioning of individual member states in this universe, including their proximity to other likeminded states.

The NDICI negotiations involved a broad variety of issues, as illustrated by the five clusters of geographic, thematic, rapid response, governance, and budgetary issues. Across this wide range of topics, member states took varying positions depending on the issue in focus, resulting in a complex pattern of positions.

However, even with such apparent complexity, negotiations frequently boil down to one or a few underlying dimensions of conflict. For instance, earlier research suggests that EU politics in general revolves around a limited number of key dimensions, notably, more versus less integration, left versus right, and fiscal discipline versus fiscal transfers (Hix 1999; Hooghe and Marks 1999; Lehner and Wasserfallen 2019).

Figure 6 below uses principal component analysis to identify the key dimensions of conflict in the NDICI negotiations. Principal components analysis (PCA) is a dimension-reduction method that can help researchers reduce a dataset containing a large set of variables into a smaller set of variables, called principal components, which summarize the main sources of variation in the data. The method is a way to "filter out the noise" while keeping as much information as possible. It is particularly useful for graphic illustration of the main dimensions of complex data, where it allows researchers to identify observations or actors that are more "alike" on these main dimensions.

In our case, we use to PCA to reduce the complexity of the wider dataset, with observations on all 55 issues, each of which is a dimension of its own, to dimensions that represent the major lines

of contestation in these negotiations. We first use PCA on issues from all clusters and, in a second step, on individual issue clusters. Since PCA performs better if data are more complete, we perform these analyses on issues that contain at least 15 adopted positions, excluding issues with fewer positions.

As illustrated in Figure 6 below, PCA analysis of issues from all clusters points to two main dimensions (these are the first two principal components). The horizontal dimension taps into issues of distribution, such as whether to prioritize LDCs or MICs and whether to make poverty-eradication the primary objective. The second vertical dimension captures issues of value conflict, such as climate, gender and migration.

Figure 6. Main dimensions of conflict



Note: Analysis based on the 26 issues with 15 or more positions.

Together, these two dimensions capture about 41 percent of the variation in member state positions. The horizontal dimension is the most dominant, accounting for 25 percent, while the vertical dimension explains 16 percent. The remaining variation in

positions (59 percent) does not fit easily into these two dominant dimensions. In sum: the issues and positions in the NDICI negotiations were partly ordered along two key dimensions of political conflict, and partly reflective of other considerations of a mixed nature.

Figure 6 also plots the overall placement of the member states in this two-dimensional space. Countries that are positioned more to the left in the figure tended to emphasize aid to MICs and the EU's neighbourhood, while countries positioned more to the right argued for funds to LDCs, poverty eradication, and climate-related action. Moreover, states located more toward the top of the figure tended to advocate a stronger focus on migration management, including the establishment of a migration facility, while states located more toward the bottom, including Sweden, advocated that NDICI should emphasize migration root causes.

Combined, the two dimensions lead to four groups of member states:

- countries in the upper left-hand corner, which sought to allocate resources to MICs, the Eastern neighbourhood, and supported more conservative positions on migration, gender and climate;
- countries in the upper right-hand corner, which preferred a stronger focus on LDCs and poverty eradication, but were more aligned with the previous group with regards to migration;
- countries in the lower left-hand corner, which wanted to emphasize MICs and the Eastern neighbourhood but adopted somewhat more progressive positions on migration;
- countries in the lower right-hand corner, which advocated the allocation of resources to LDCs and poverty eradication and tended to also hold progressive positions on climate, migration, and gender. As a member state advocating an emphasis on LDCs and progressive values, Sweden is clearly located in the lower-right hand corner.

Interviews support this picture of the overall coalition patterns. According to several interviewees, the member states frequently coalesced into well-known coalitions of likeminded actors, notably, older versus newer donor countries, and countries with progressive versus conservative positions on issues pertaining to climate, migration, and gender (Commission official 1; Commission official 2; German Government official). These overall coalition patterns also tie in well with findings in previous research (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014; Delputte et al. 2016; Szent-Iványi and Kugiel 2020; Karlsson and Tallberg 2021).

While Figure 6 summarizes the location of member states on the key dimensions of contention for the 26 issues with 15 or more adopted positions in the NDICI negotiations combined, a similar analysis may be conducted for each individual cluster of issues. How were member states distributed on the key dimensions of conflict with regard to geographic, thematic, governance, and budgetary issues (see section 2.1 and Table A1 in the appendix)?

Figures 7–10 present the positioning of the member states and EU institutions on the dominant dimension of conflict for each of the four main clusters, leaving aside rapid response issues, which were too few to provide sufficient data for such an analysis. Again, it is important to note that the main dimension only captures part of the variation in positions on the included issues (25 to 36 percent) and that only a smaller number of issues – those pertaining to a particular cluster and having at least 15 member state positions – are used in these analyses. Because a smaller number of issues of varying substantive orientation are used in the analyses, the identified principal dimensions differ somewhat from those identified in Figure 6. For example, while Figures 7 and 8 overlap relatively well with the horizontal and vertical dimensions of Figure 6, respectively, Figures 9 and 10 do not correspond to any of the dimensions illustrated there.

Figures 7–10 are indicative of the key coalition patterns for each of the four issue clusters. They point to some diversity and specificity in coalition patterns across the four issue clusters – an observation further supported by interviews underlining the issue-specific nature of some coalition patterns (Commission official 1; German Government official). At the same time, these figures also reinforce the impression of two main coalitions: a group of northern member states, sometimes joined by the Commission and the Parliament, and a group of eastern member states. For other clusters, the main line of contention was drawn between the EU's supranational institutions, in particular the EP, and the member states, reflecting long-standing patterns of contestation in EU governance.

Figure 7 shows the main dimension for geographic issues, which captures conflict over geographic priorities. The countries positioned toward the left of the spectrum wanted to prioritize MICs, more funding for the Eastern Neighbourhood, a higher share of that funding going to cross-border cooperation, and earmarking of funding for Central Asia. This group of states almost exclusively consisted of Central and East European countries. According to interviews, this was a very stable group throughout the negotiations, especially on the issue of whether to include the ENI in NDICI (Commission official 1).

Figure 7. Main dimension of conflict: geographic issues



The actors positioned toward the right of the spectrum took the opposite positions and generally wished to prioritize development funding for LDCs and Sub-Saharan Africa. This group consisted of ambitious northern donors as well as the Commission and the Parliament. A diverse group of member states, including Sweden, are found closer to the middle, but with an orientation toward the right end of the spectrum in relation to the overall actor positioning.

Figure 8 below presents the main dimension for thematic issues, which captures conflict over contested political values. Countries positioned toward the right of the spectrum sought a greater emphasis on gender equality, higher earmarks for climate-related action, and a greater focus on the root causes of migration.

Figure 8. Main dimension of conflict: thematic issues



This group mainly consisted of the northern donors and the Parliament, with Sweden as one of the strongest advocates. Countries located toward the left of the spectrum were sceptical of gender equality ambitions and wished a greater emphasis on managing migration through funds and conditions. Hungary is situated on the extreme left, a function of its outlier position on several of these issues. On these issues, a cluster of member states and the Commission took positions closer to the middle.

Figure 9 captures the key dimension for governance issues, which taps a number of issues related to guiding principles and approaches for NDICI.

Figure 9. Main dimension of conflict: governance issues



Here, we note that the Parliament and the Commission are located on the extreme right of the spectrum, reflecting their preferences for policy solutions that award them significant influence, including via more extensive usage of delegated acts. In contrast, member states typically sought to ensure stronger influence for themselves, as is visible in their clustering towards the left. Governments located on the very left, especially France, sought to ensure strong member states' strategic influence over NDICI, via comitology and other mechanisms.

Figure 10 shows the main dimension for budgetary issues, which captures a varied set of issues of a budgetary nature.

Figure 10. Main dimension of conflict: budgetary issues



While this dimension is less easy to interpret, actors positioned more to the right of the spectrum preferred a higher share of the total funding to consist of ODA, to integrate the EDF within NDICI, to avoid earmarking in the articles of the regulation, and to provide the Commission with greater financial flexibility in the implementation of the instrument. The Parliament occupied the most extreme position in this respect, but other actors with an orientation leaning in this direction were Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Sweden, as well as the Commission. Countries toward the left end of the spectrum advocated the opposite positions. This group consisted of France and a mix of eastern and northern donors, such as Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, and the Netherlands.

Figures 6–10 provide an indication of how particular member states were positioned in relation to the overall collective of member states in the NDICI negotiations. They reveal that Sweden generally belonged to a group of likeminded northern donors, prioritizing LDCs, poverty reduction, ODA, and liberal values with respect to gender equality, migration, and the environment.

Figure 11 below provides a more detailed picture of which actors were most and least closely aligned with Sweden on geographic, thematic, governance, and budgetary issues. The figure shows the average distance to Sweden's positions on all issues included in a cluster.[1] Across these four clusters of issues, the member states that tended to be closest to the positions of Sweden were Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg (see also Figure 6). Conversely, the member states that tended to be furthest from the positions of Sweden were Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.

[1] Actors that did not adopt positions on at least three issues in a cluster are excluded from this analysis.

Figure 11. Position alignment with Sweden



When each cluster of issues is considered separately, the pattern is slightly more varied. On geographic issues, the most likeminded states were, in descending order, Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland. On thematic issues, the most likeminded states were Slovenia, Luxembourg, Spain, Ireland, Finland, Latvia, and Estonia. On governance issues, the most likeminded states were Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Germany, and Ireland. And on budgetary issues, the most likeminded states were Germany, Luxemburg, Portugal, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovenia, France, and Poland.

These patterns suggest that Sweden's likeminded partners typically are not restricted to the Nordic Plus Group (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands, as well as non-EU members Iceland, Norway, and the UK), with which the country has most institutionalized cooperation. They also suggest that the patterns of likemindedness partly vary depending on the types of issues under consideration.

Compared to the positions of Sweden, the Commission and the Parliament were generally neither very close nor very distant, but typically positioned toward the middle of the ranking. The exception are budgetary issues, where the Commission and the Parliament both held positions closer to Sweden, and geographic issues, where the Parliament held positions further from Sweden.

However, not all issues were of equal importance to Sweden, even if Sweden took positions on most issues. Who is likeminded or not may be of particular importance on those issues prioritized by a country. Figure 12 therefore ranks the member states and EU institutions in terms of likemindedness on those 35 issues among the 55 that were judged as having "high" or "very high" priority for Sweden (see Table A2 in the Appendix).

Figure 12. Position alignment with Sweden on issues prioritized by Sweden



Figure 12 largely confirms the picture from the analysis of all issues. Member states that were particularly close to Sweden on issues prioritized by Sweden were, in descending order, Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Germany, and Ireland. This pattern indicates that Sweden belongs to a group of states that take likeminded positions on those issues of most importance to Sweden, but also other contested issues in EU development cooperation. The governments least likeminded with Sweden are Hungary, Bulgaria, and Croatia, which typically held opposing positions on the negotiated issues.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter shows that member states were varyingly engaged in the negotiations on NDICI. Some member states were particularly active, taking positions on most issues of negotiation: Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands,

Poland, and Hungary. This group includes several small or medium-sized countries traditionally belonging to the group of ambitious donors. The analysis indicates a strong, positive relationship between a country's financial commitment to development and position-taking in the negotiations. Sweden fits this pattern well, being the most generous donor and one of the countries with most positions in the negotiations.

This pattern largely recurs when analysing the number of position statements made by member states in the negotiations as well as the order in which positions were expressed. In both respects, France stands out as particularly active within the group of highly engaged countries. The EU's other dominant member state – Germany – was overall relatively passive in the NDICI negotiations. Least engaged in the negotiations across several measures were Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania, possibly indicating a lower level of interest in NDICI overall.

The analysis reveals two key dimensions of conflict in the negotiations. A first dimension taps into issues of distribution, such as whether to prioritize LDCs or MICs and whether to make poverty eradication the primary objective. A second dimension captures issues of value conflict, such as climate, migration, and gender. Member states took varying positions on these two dimensions, leading to four separate groups of likeminded countries.

Sweden belonged to the group of countries that advocated more resources to LDCs and poverty eradication, and that also held progressive positions on climate, migration, and gender. Across all issues in the NDICI negotiations, the member states that tended to be closest to the positions of Sweden were Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Conversely, the member states that tended to be furthest away from the positions of Sweden were Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.

When the four main clusters of issues in the negotiations are considered separately, the patterns are somewhat more diverse, underlining the issue-specific nature of coalitions in the EU. On geographic and thematic issues, the negotiations generally pitted a group of northern member states, sometimes joined by the Commission and the Parliament, against a group of eastern member states. On governance and budgetary issues, the main line of contention was drawn between the EU's supranational institutions and the member states.

3 Bargaining Success

Bargaining in the EU is characterized by a high degree of compromise. In negotiation processes involving both member states and EU institutions, all actors typically must make concessions in the long process toward a negotiated package deal. Despite the willingness to compromise, EU negotiations also reflect a political contest to get one's perspective heard and reflected in legislative text. If we view the NDICI negotiations in the aggregate, which actors were more or less influential? Were the same actors influential across all clusters or did their success vary? To what extent did Sweden manage to influence outcomes on its prioritized issues? In this chapter, we describe variation in bargaining success, mapping the extent to which Sweden and other actors achieved their preferred outcomes in the negotiations of NDICI.

3.1 Mean bargaining success

To measure bargaining success, we draw on preference attainment models as these have been developed in political science and applied in the study of multilateral negotiations (e.g., Achen 2006; Arregui and Thompson 2009; Lundgren et al. 2019). These models conceptualize bargaining success as the degree to which actors attain their preferred policy outcome for a given issue: Does an actor get what it set out to achieve? An actor's preferences are better attained the closer the outcome is to its ideal policy, and vice versa.

We operationalize bargaining success as the distance between an actor's initial position on a given issue and the collectively agreed outcome on the same issue. Given that both positions and outcomes are coded on a 0 to 100 scale, the measure of bargaining success also ranges between 0 and 100. In a given negotiation, an actor that achieved exactly the outcome it had advocated at the outset is awarded a success score of 100. An actor that not only failed to achieve its preference but ultimately agreed to the policy option most

different from its initial position receives a score of 0. Actors that achieved neither their ideal policy nor the most different policy receive scores between 0 and 100.

In Figure 13, we present the average success attained by individual actors across the 55 issues covered in our data. The score thus gives an indication of how well actors fared not in any individual negotiation but over the entire course of formal negotiations over the design and orientation of NDICI. Higher scores correspond to a smaller distance between initial preferences and outcomes and thus indicate a higher degree of bargaining success; lower scores correspond to a lower degree of bargaining success.

Figure 13. Average bargaining success, by actor



Figure 13 suggests three principal patterns in the distribution of bargaining success. First, mean bargaining success is relatively evenly spread out. The mean score is 62 (the median is 63) and most actors are positioned in the range between 55 and 75. Sweden, with a mean bargaining success score of 72, ranks fourth from the top, suggesting that the country on average managed to achieve its preferred

outcomes quite well in the NDICI negotiations. The most successful country was Cyprus, with a mean success score of 87. However, Cyprus only adopted positions on 11 issues and often only after most other countries had declared their positions (see Figure 4), so this score most likely reflects strategic behaviour by a marginally involved actor. The least successful actor is Hungary, with a mean score of 39. Given that Hungary adopted many positions (30) and often early (see Figure 4) it is more likely that this outlier result reflects actual performance, i.e., that Hungary only rarely managed to achieve its preferred outcomes in these negotiations.

Taken as a whole, the relatively symmetrical distribution of success scores indicates that the NDICI negotiations produced a compromise outcome reflective of a broad span of preferences in the EU. With a few possible exceptions, notably Hungary, there were few clear winners or losers. This would suggest that these negotiations conform to a wider pattern in EU negotiations, as several previous studies of success in extended negotiations have identified similarly "flat" distributions of gains (e.g., Arregui and Thomson 2009; Lundgren et al. 2019).

A second pattern is that there is no major difference between member states and EU institutions in terms of bargaining success. Both the Commission and the Parliament are placed in the middle of the distribution, with the Commission in the lower half and the Parliament in the higher half. While these institutions scored some important successes, including the integration of the ENI (GEO2) and the budgetization of the EDF within NDICI (BUDG4), they also had to make significant concessions in the negotiations, for example, regarding the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) (GOV7) and member states' strategic influence in governance (GOV2).

Third, while there is relative symmetry among member states in terms of mean bargaining success, there is an indication of variation between different categories of member states. We note, for example, that several of the states found in the lower right quadrant

of Figure 6, which contained countries holding progressive views on migration and gender while also preferring a focus on LDCs, rank among the most successful. Next to Sweden, this group includes Luxemburg, Belgium, and Finland, suggesting that a set of smaller countries with strong traditions as donors and development partners managed to influence the shape of NDICI more than most other member states. Interviews contribute observations consistent with this picture. According to several officials, particularly influential member states were Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Commission official 1; Finnish Government official).

Conversely, most Eastern European countries had relatively low bargaining success. On several issues, including whether to reference Article 208 to place poverty eradication at the centre of NDICI (GOV8) and whether to integrate the ENI (GEO2), most of them had to make concessions to actors with opposing preferences. However, reflecting the evenly distributed overall gains, this group of countries also scored some important victories. For example, most East European countries achieved their desired outcome on the size of cross-border cooperation programmes within the financial envelope for the Neighbourhood (GEO6). It should also be noted that there is significant diversity among Eastern European countries, both with regards to negotiation positions (Figures 6–10) and outcomes (Figure 13).

Interestingly, neither France nor Germany appears among the most influential member states by this measure of bargaining success. While France was very active in the negotiations, as previously noted, its approach to the negotiations did not translate into France reaching its objectives better than most other member states. Interviews suggest that this may be because France laid down "red lines" very early on in the negotiations and then was forced to surrender those as bargaining converged on compromise solutions (Finnish Government official). While Germany was less active in the negotiations, it achieved slightly higher bargaining success than France. This outcome may be related to the earlier observation that

Germany generally was quite content with the proposal, possibly reflecting influence over the Commission at the pre-negotiation stage, and therefore took positions that did not deviate significantly from the mainstream. However, interviewees also suggest that Germany was not as influential as it could have been (Commission official 1).

In Figure 14, we provide a more detailed picture of actors' bargaining success on geographic, thematic, governance, and budgetary issues. This allows us to discern patterns of variation and identify the actors that were particularly successful, or unsuccessful, in the four major clusters of issues identified in the material.

Figure 14. Average bargaining success, by actor, by cluster and actor



As pointed out by one interviewee, "influence was issue dependent" (Parliament official). When disaggregated in this way, it becomes apparent that Sweden's overall success largely originates in its ability to attain its preferences on governance and geographic issues, where the country ranks at the very top or close to the top. On thematic and budgetary issues, Sweden places in the middle of the distribution. Part of the reason may be that Sweden was an outlier on several thematic issues, for instance, relating to gender and climate, which likely made it more difficult for the country to achieve its most preferred outcomes.

More generally, we note some revealing patterns across member state groupings, suggestive of how concessions were traded in the NDICI negotiation process.

On geographic issues, Northern countries, with an average success score of 61, typically did better than their Southern (54) or Eastern (49) counterparts, epitomized by the high success observed for countries such as Netherlands and Sweden. Some of the issues at the heart of the debate, such as whether to integrate ENI into NDICI (GEO2) and the degree of priority between MICs and LDCs (GEO13) were fairly decisive losses for Eastern European members, as were the level of funding for Sub-Saharan Africa (GEO8) and the Asia-Pacific region (GEO10).

On thematic issues, the distribution between groups of member states was considerably more even, with Southern countries receiving the highest average success score (69), followed by Eastern (68) and Northern countries (63). Given that the thematic issues were the most debated cluster during these negotiations – some 40 percent of all position statements were made on thematic issues – this distribution is reflective of the ability of the collective of member states to find compromises on the most salient issues.

By comparison, we note a more asymmetric distribution on governance issues, indicating that this was an area where some actors had to give up considerably more than others. Northern and

Southern countries received dramatically higher success scores (72 and 71, respectively) compared with countries in Eastern Europe (46), suggesting that older and larger donors could exert influence in this domain. For example, Eastern countries had to give up their efforts to establish a "European preference" with regards to implementation partners (GOV3), where Northern donors (together with the Commission and the Parliament) defended the status quo policy, giving no preference to European actors.

Finally, on budgetary issues, we again observe a more symmetrical distribution of gains across geographic groupings. Eastern European member states were the most successful (65) with Southern (61) and Northern (59) countries trailing. One budgetary issue where Eastern European countries fared well was the discussion about whether to include a reference to a 0.15–0.20 percent ODA target (of GNI) for LDCs in the NDICI articles, where Northern donors, including Sweden, conceded their preferred policy and agreed to placing this reference in the recitals, indicating less emphasis.

Overall, these patterns suggest the presence of compromises that saw Northern countries gain on geographic and governance issues, where Eastern countries made significant concessions, only to gain marginally more on thematic and budgetary issues. Generally, compromises and exchanges were a prominent feature of these negotiations, according to interviews. While not always said, it was always known that issues were linked, such that losses on one issue were traded against gains on another (Commission official 1). This dynamic was not only present in interstate negotiations between the member states in the Council, but also in interinstitutional negotiations in the trialogues. An example in the latter category was the dual agreement on governance and migration at the concluding trialogue (Commission official 1; German Government official).

The Commission enjoyed varied success across the four clusters. The area where the agreed regulation most reflected its initial proposal was on budgetary issues (average success of 79) while the thematic cluster was its least successful area (48). Conversely, the

Parliament enjoyed its greatest success in the thematic area, where it recorded the second highest average success score of all actors, largely reflecting its ability to add its priorities on issues less discussed by member states, such as funding for the programme for Global Challenges (THEM17). By comparison, the Parliament enjoyed lower success on geographic and budgetary issues, where it had to concede more to member states (Figure 14).

An important caveat should be kept in mind when interpreting these data. The success measure, as defined above, is not necessarily informative about how an actor arrived at a particular score. It may be that it managed to extract concessions from other countries, leading these other states to accept a policy design that they did not prefer. It may be that it skilfully coordinated different blocs of member states, leading them to agree on a compromise solution overlapping with its preference. Or it may be that it was simply lucky and that negotiations within the EU collective, for one reason or another, converged on the particular solution that it liked the most. When aggregated over many negotiations, such as the 55 issues covered here, however, the luck aspect should cancel out, such that these results approximate actors' actual ability to get what they want in the negotiations.

Similarly, the Commission's bargaining success in light of these data should be interpreted with care. Interviews suggest that the Commission drafted the original proposal with two overriding objectives in mind: substantively, to transform EU development cooperation by introducing a new integrated framework, and procedurally, to make sure that the proposed text was sufficiently balanced for the proposal not to be rejected by the Council or the Parliament (Commission official 1; Commission official 2; German Government official; Parliament official). While our method interprets moves away from the Commission's original proposal as "losses" for the Commission, we cannot know for sure whether the conceded positions were actual items favoured by the Commission or items included by the Commission to balance the proposal.

Moreover, the Commission arguably achieved its greater objectives of passing a comprehensive reform with support from both the Council and the Parliament.

Finally, these data only capture the bargaining success of actors participating in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Party on NDICI. Yet interviews consistently point to influence by one actor external to the negotiations: the EIB. The specific issue pertained to whether financing under NDICI should be carried out through an open financial architecture, as proposed by the Commission, or through a lending mandate for the EIB, as previously had been the case and was favoured by the EIB itself. On this particular issue, the EIB is described as having pulled strings behind the scenes, mobilizing a group of member states to protect its interests in the Council, ultimately arriving at a compromise close to its preferences (Commission official 1; Finnish Government official; German Government official; Swedish Government official).

3.2 Weighted bargaining success

The analysis thus far has given all issues equal weight. However, not all issues included in a negotiation process are necessarily of equal prominence. Some issues attract considerably more attention than others, becoming the "hot issues" of the negotiation process. Moreover, not all issues are equally important to all actors. Some actors care more about certain issues, attaching great importance to them, while they care less about others. Other actors may make a different assessment altogether. We therefore extend the analysis of bargaining success to consider variation in "salience," i.e., the priority actors attach to an issue.

We account for variation in salience in two different ways. First, we weight issues by the degree of collective contestation. Issues that attract controversy and debate, articulating the main political cleavages of a multilateral process, can be understood as the most significant. Actors that win the day on such issues may be said to have exercised more political influence over the process as a whole.

We operationalize "general issue salience" based on the number of position statements on each issue (See Figure 5). While it is of course possible that important issues are not subject to debate, it is reasonable to assume that the issues that saw the most voluminous and repeated exchanges are also issues that many actors consider important.

Figure 15 below illustrates the average bargaining success by actor, weighted for general issue salience. These success scores are similar to the unweighted scores exhibited in Figure 13 in several ways – including the poor performance of Hungary – but there are some key differences.

Figure 15. Average bargaining success, by actor, weighted for general issue salience



Most importantly, when issue salience is weighed into the calculation of bargaining success, Sweden ranks as the most successful of all actors. This means that Sweden was particularly apt at getting its preferred outcome on the issues subject to most debate in the Ad Hoc Working Party, as recorded in the MFA reports. Below, we

dissect Sweden's bargaining success in greater detail. We also note that Germany scores higher than in the previous distribution, suggesting that it managed to achieve outcomes closer to its ideal policies on several of the most contested issues. For example, Germany managed to get its preferred outcome on the issue of a European preference for implementing partners (GOV3), which ranks among the most contested issues, as measured by the number of position statements.

Another way to weight issues is to account for "actor-specific issue salience". In Figure 16, we display the average bargaining success by actor, weighted for the number of positions recorded for each actor and issue. The assumption here is that actors care more about issues on which they more often make their voice heard.

Figure 16. Average bargaining success, weighted by actor-specific salience



Again, we note many similarities to the unweighted success scores, suggesting that our key results are not dependent on the measure used. We also note, however, that some actors appear to have been particularly successful in getting their way on the issues they care the

most about. The top five countries in this regard are Latvia, Austria, Spain, Germany, and Sweden. Latvia adopted positions on only 22 issues (see Figure 1) and does not rank highly on the list of statements (Figure 3) but the country was unusually good in attaining its preferred outcomes on its prioritized issues, such as including a reference to nuclear safety (THEM21).

Several of the countries that rank among the less successful countries on the unweighted success measures (Figure 13) are again found there, such as Hungary and Slovakia. Other countries' relative success worsens when actor-specific salience is taken into account. We note that France, which played a very active role in these negotiations (Figure 3) and often declared their position early on (Figure 4) is significantly penalized by this measure, ranking fourth from the bottom. This result suggests that France, compared with other actors, did not manage to get its preferred outcome on the issues where it was most active. For instance, despite intense and repeated advocacy, France did not manage to prevent the integration of the European Neighbourhood Initiative into what became NDICI (issue GEO2).

It is also noteworthy that the Commission ranks very low on this and the previous weighted measure (Figure 15), potentially because the issues that attracted most statements where those were member states wished to diverge from the Commission's original proposal, while the Commission did not need to speak up on issues where the negotiations evolved in line with its tabled proposal. Weighing issues by the number of statements also requires a different interpretation with regard to the Commission. While the Commission was clearly advocating in support of its proposal in the Ad Hoc Working Party meetings, its role requires it to speak on issues, for purposes of clarification and process, regardless of whether it ranks the issue among its priorities. For that reason, its distribution of statements will necessarily be flatter, making it less informative for distinguishing between issues of different salience.

3.3 Sweden's bargaining success on prioritized issues

In the Swedish case, we have access to richer source material, allowing for a more refined analysis of Sweden's bargaining success on prioritized issues. For Sweden, we have had access to meeting instructions and MFA reports, as well as validation interviews with MFA officials, which has allowed us to assess, with greater accuracy than for other countries, which issues were most salient for the Swedish government. This has enabled us to move beyond the proxies used in the previous section to arrive at a more granular and accurate measurement, ranking issues from "very low" to "very high" levels of priority (Table A2 in the Appendix). For example, increasing the reliance on Gender Equality Policy Markers ("G-Markers") (THEM19) and increasing the funding for the Southern Neighbourhood (GEO4) were assessed as being of "very high" importance for Sweden, whereas earmarking for Central Asia (GEO12) had "very low" importance. It should be noted that this analysis was mainly based on material pre-dating the outcome of the negotiations, reducing the risk of post hoc rationalization that would make Sweden appear more successful on prioritized issues than otherwise would be the case.

Figure 17 presents the mean bargaining success for Sweden ordered by assessed priority level. The overarching impression is that Sweden managed to negotiate in accordance with its priorities. The highest bargaining success is observed for issues ranked as having "high" or "very high" priority, whereas it was less successful in attaining its preferred outcome on issues with "low" or "medium" priority. In other words, Sweden managed to "get what it wanted" to a greater extent on issues that mattered more to Sweden than on issues that mattered less.

Figure 17. Sweden's average bargaining success, by priority level



Data on Sweden's reported statements align well with this pattern: On nine of the ten issues for which most Swedish statements are recorded, the country managed to get its preferred policy (see also Figure 16).

It is worth noting that several of the issues prioritized by Sweden also were among the most salient and debated, based on how many member states adopted positions. On the issues ranked as having "very high" priority by Sweden, 70 percent of member states adopted positions, compared with 45 percent for issues with lower levels of priority.

In Figure 18 below, we disaggregate the information further, providing the exact success score attained by Sweden for all the issues that are assessed as having "high" or "very high" priority. We note that the outcome of the negotiations aligned with Sweden's preference in nine out of fourteen issues with "high" priority and in five out of eleven with "very high" priority. In cases where Sweden did not get exactly what it wanted, the outcome in most cases represented a compromise relatively favourable to Swedish interests.

Figure 18. Sweden's bargaining success, by issue



One area prioritized by Sweden was gender equality. Two of the issues in this area are scored as "very high" priorities for Sweden: whether and how to include language on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) (THEM18), and the issue mentioned above, related to G-Markers (THEM19), where Sweden took active leadership in collaboration with Belgium, Denmark and Ireland (Swedish government official). Both issues represent negotiation successes for Sweden. For example, on the latter issue, Sweden advocated that at least 85 percent of new programs should have G-Mark I or II, and that there should be a specific earmarking for G-II, a position that was upheld in the final NDICI agreement.

Another prioritized area where Sweden enjoyed great success was orienting NDICI toward a greater focus on LDCs and poverty eradication. Across several issues in this domain (GEO13, GOV8, and BUDG6), Sweden and other likeminded actors, including Ireland and other smaller donors, managed to get the outcomes they desired or very close to that.

On a few prioritized issues, Sweden had to make significant concessions. One was the issue of whether to codify the balance of Neighbourhood funding between the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods (GEO7). Here, the Commission's proposal of a continued "gentleman's agreement," supported by most Southern member states as well as the Parliament, won the day, against a coalition that included Sweden, Finland, and several East European countries. Another significant concession was experienced on the already mentioned issue of where to place a reference to a 0.15–0.20 percent ODA goal for LDCs (BUDG7), where Sweden and likeminded actors had to yield ground to an opposing coalition.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter points to three key findings with regard to actors' relative ability to attain their preferences in the NDICI negotiations.

First, with some exceptions, no state or supranational actor emerged as a distinct winner or loser in these negotiations taken as a whole. Rather, the analysis show that most actors managed to attain several of their desired outcomes, suggesting that NDICI, as realized, represents an agreement marked by significant compromise.

Compromises and exchanges entailed that Northern countries overall gained on geographic and governance issues, where Eastern countries made concessions, while the latter gained on thematic and budgetary issues, where the former made concessions. This dynamic of give and take was also present in interinstitutional negotiations between the Council and the Parliament.

Second, within the larger compromise, there were some identifiable differences across categories of member states. On average, traditional donors in Northern Europe were more successful in attaining their preferences. Conversely, most Eastern European countries had relatively low bargaining success. Interestingly, neither France nor Germany appears to have been especially influential, as both countries showed average bargaining success, despite their varying approaches to the negotiations.

The supranational institutions, too, scored average success in reaching their preferences in the NDICI negotiations. However, this analysis may underestimate the Commission's success, since it does not consider the Commission's larger strategic objectives of passing a comprehensive integrative reform with support from both the Council and the Parliament. Interviews further point to the influence of one supranational actor not formally involved in the negotiations – the EIB – which successfully shaped outcomes on the financial architecture of NDICI.

Third, Sweden ranks among the most successful countries in the NDICI negotiations, especially when we take the salience of issues into account. Sweden scored important negotiation victories on several issues it had identified as priorities going into the negotiation, including legislation relating to gender equality and poverty eradication.

4 Sources of Influence

The previous chapter established some key patterns with regard to how successful different actors were in attaining their preferred outcome in the NDICI negotiations. How can such patterns be explained? What factors made states more or less influential in these negotiations? Identifying the factors that correlate with bargaining success can help us better interpret aggregate patterns, identify possible reasons behind the relative success of Sweden and other actors, and point to factors that may be relevant for future policy and prioritization.

We approach this question using methods of multivariate statistical analysis. Multivariate regression analysis allows us to take into account more than one explanatory factor at the same time, identifying their relative weight in accounting for observed differences in bargaining success. We focus on factors highlighted in the literature on EU negotiations, including voting power, strategic positioning and negotiating behaviour, diplomatic networks, coalitions with the Commission, and holding the rotating Presidency of the Council. We also integrate some novel factors, made possible by our independent, fine-grained data collection, specifically the order in which a member state makes their positions public to other member states involved in the negotiations and measures of sector-specific commitment.

We illustrate the main findings of our analysis graphically and present further details in the appendix. We focus our presentation on factors where the analyses yielded statistically significant results but also mention other results in the discussion. The regression table (Table A4) in the appendix include estimates about how confident we are that we observe associations between explanatory factors and bargaining success.

4.1 Structural and procedural power

Considerable attention in political analysis is focused on factors relating to state power – such as population, wealth, and votes – and their impact on outcomes. In our analysis of the NDICI negotiations, we include some key measures of structural and procedural power, including voting strength, economic size, and whether a country held the rotating Presidency, which are conventional proxies in the study of EU negotiations.

In Figure 19, we illustrate the relationship between a country's voting power in the Council when decisions are adopted using qualified majority voting and its predicted level of bargaining success. As is evident from the horizontal line, there is no meaningful relationship between these variables. Countries with a low number of votes do not do significantly better or worse than countries with a high number of votes. We attain the same results if we change the vote variable to measures of economic size (GDP) or population, which are closely correlated with council votes. From this we can infer that, when it came to success during the NDICI negotiations, voting power or size were not determining factors.

Figure 19. Bargaining success as a function of Council votes



Note: Grey shading indicates 95% confidence interval.

While it may run contrary to popular conceptions of bargaining in the EU, the finding that bargaining success is not driven by variation in votes or structural resources corresponds to much of the existing empirical literature on EU negotiations (Bailer 2004; Slapin 2006; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Lundgren et al. 2019). While some larger member states were typically more active in the negotiations (in particular France, see Figure 3), it appears that the NDICI negotiations conform to a wider pattern of distributing gains across both large and small member states.

One caveat pertains to the potential role of pre-negotiations. In some cases, such as the reforms of the Eurozone 2010–2015, the EU's larger member states exerted influence at the pre-negotiation stage by keeping certain issues on the table and other issues off the table (Lundgren et al. 2019). In such cases, analyses from the actual negotiations might underestimate the influence of larger member states. Interviewees for this report could not identify any instances of larger member states keeping issues off the table. However, this does not exclude the possibility that they might have influenced the Commission's original proposal in some other way.

Next to voting power, countries may enjoy other sources of procedural power. In the context of EU negotiations, one source of procedural power is holding the Council Presidency, which rotates every six months. The Council Presidency awards a country a central role in the EU machinery, giving it an informational advantage and agenda setting powers, which are commonly thought to increase its influence in negotiations (Tallberg 2006; Häge 2017). In our case, the results differ between models (see Table A1 in the Appendix), but the estimated association is always positive and statistically significant. Figure 20 plots the predicted values, indicating that countries holding the rotating Presidency when the observed issue was negotiated, could expect a success 18 points higher than if the country did not hold the Presidency, all other things equal.

Figure 20. Bargaining success as a function of Council Presidency status



This means that the countries that held the rotating Presidency at some point during the NDICI negotiations – Austria, Romania, Finland, Croatia, and Germany – may have been able to transform their procedural influence into influence over the substantive negotiations.

A Parliament official suggests that this influence partly derived from the special position that Presidencies enjoy as representatives of the Council in its negotiations with the Parliament, giving Presidencies opportunities to engage in two-level games: "They were selective in terms of how they communicated the positions toward the Council and the Parliament." An official of the German Government, which held the Presidency at the concluding stage of the negotiations, concurs: "We had negotiated margins of discretion for the Presidency."

4.2 Negotiation behaviour and positioning

We found that differences in hard sources of power, such as council votes and country size, could not account for differences in bargaining success. So, what did? A second cluster of possible explanatory factors relate to negotiation behaviour and positioning: the order of adopting a position, the extremity of this position in relation to the larger group, and negotiation activity. In contrast to several of the factors discussed below, such as voting strength, this is a set of factors that member states have considerable control over, since they capture, at some level, the nature of political initiative and leadership.

Figure 21 illustrates how the predicted level of bargaining success depends on the order in which an actor declared its position in the Ad Hoc Working Party. This may provide insights into the strategic behaviour of actors. We note that the estimated line has a positive slope, indicating that a later adoption is associated with a higher predicted bargaining success. On average, a member state that adopts its position last, after all other member states have done so, is estimated to have a 20-point higher success score than the member state that goes first. In other words, actors that go late are more likely to get what they want than actors that go early.

Figure 21. Bargaining success as a function of order of position adoption



Note: Grey shading indicates 95% confidence interval.

We cannot necessarily infer that this positive correlation reflects greater influence. Based on our data, we cannot distinguish between positions taken by actors late in the game because they do not care very much and positions taken late in the game for strategic reasons. Considering the qualitative documentation from the NDICI negotiations (Commission official 1; German Government official), and what we know of other EU negotiations (Lundgren et al. 2019), the former is more likely: The latecomers are most likely member states that do not hold particularly salient views and only declare their position when other actors, holding more salient views, have

already set out their positions. Because the latecomers can adopt positions in the middle, where many compromises are forged, the outcome is more likely to align with their position.

This interpretation is corroborated by the pattern exhibited in Figure 22, where we plot the predicted bargaining success as a function of how distant an actor's position is from the mean of all actors' positions. The negative slope of the estimated line indicates that actors that adopt positions significantly deviant from the mean position are likely to see their bargaining success reduced, whereas actors at or closer to the middle are more likely to achieve their preferred outcome.

Figure 22. Bargaining success as a function of extremity of position



Note: Grey shading indicates 95% confidence interval.

The greater success of centrist countries does not necessarily indicate that they possess greater negotiation acumen. More likely, the benefits of centrism flow from the fact that EU negotiations are typically characterized by compromise and reciprocity, whereby two sides gradually converge on a solution in the middle. Such a negotiation dynamic benefits actors with preferences in the middle of the bargaining range, while penalizing those that take positions at either side of the spectrum.

Our results also indicate that sharing a position with the Commission is associated with a higher bargaining success (Table A1 in the Appendix). All else equal, aligning with the Commission translates into a predicted increase in success roughly equivalent to that of holding the rotating Presidency. This finding is consistent with the literature on EU negotiations (e.g., Cross 2013) and suggests that states may sometimes draw strategic benefit from positioning themselves close to the key agenda-setter in the EU.

As discussed above, our preference attainment approach precludes analysis of influence at the proposal stage. It is possible that some states sharing a position with the Commission do so because they have influenced the orientation of the Commission's proposal before it was formally introduced. However, there is considerable variation across issues in the degree to which member states align with the Commission and, on average, smaller states were somewhat more likely to share a position with the Commission than larger ones. This implies that pre-negotiation influence, to the extent it is reflected in shared positions with the Commission, does not appear to be concentrated to one single category of member states.

Providing yet further nuance to these findings on positioning is the pattern illustrated in Figure 23, plotting the predicted bargaining success as a function of the number of position statements an actor made on individual issues during the NDICI negotiations. We note that the line is ascending, indicating a positive relationship between the two variables. In other words, actors were more likely to attain their preferred outcomes on issues they made a high number of statements about.

Figure 23. Bargaining success as a function of the number of position statements



Note: Grey shading indicates 95% confidence interval.

This correlation is consistent with several possible interpretations. It is possible that it reflects a dynamic of persuasion: taking the initiative and speaking frequently on an issue, advocating your position, convinces others of the merits of your case, leading them to shift their positions and align behind yours. It cannot be ruled out, however, that actors were simply more likely to become active on issues where they perceived, as the negotiations unfolded, they were likely to succeed.

While limited, the qualitative evidence is better aligned with the persuasion interpretation. Interviews point to several cases where some member states pushed hard for a particular position, trying to convince others through repeated argumentation, eventually resulting in bargaining success (Commission official 1; German Government official). One example is member states' strategic influence (GOV2), where France engaged in extensive persuasion and reached an outcome close to its interests. A reverse example is funding to the European Neighbourhood, where Germany due to internal divisions did not participate actively in the negotiations and therefore is deemed to have had limited influence.

4.3 Development commitment and expertise

The descriptive results in Section 3.1 indicated that there were differences across different types of donors. Countries with a longer tradition as donors differed from those that have become donors only recently, and larger donors differed from smaller donors, both in terms of their preferred policies and their degree of bargaining success. In Figure 24, we show that a country's financial commitment to development, as proxied by its level of ODA in proportion to its overall economy (GNI) is positively associated with bargaining success. The magnitude of the effect should not be exaggerated, but countries which provide a larger portion of their incomes as ODA, such as Sweden and Luxemburg, were more likely to be successful in these negotiations.

Figure 24. Bargaining success as a function of ODA proportion



Note: Grey shading indicates 95% confidence interval.

There are several possible interpretations of this pattern. First, it is likely that countries with a high ODA percentage are perceived as particularly committed, in political and financial terms, to the policy area under negotiation, development cooperation. Such commitment is likely to translate into credibility at the negotiation table, enabling certain countries to occasionally shape outcomes in ways they otherwise would not be able to. Research on multilateral negotiations have pointed to the importance of political commitment. For example, in the negotiations of the Paris Agreement on climate

change, the so-called High Ambition Coalition, a group of member states with particular interest and commitment to the issue, had a determining influence on the negotiations (e.g., Brun 2016).

Second, countries that are proportionally large donors are more likely to have amassed relevant expertise in development, compared with smaller donors or countries that only recently got involved. Knowledge of the issues is very likely to have shaped countries' varying ability to judge the wider ramifications of the Commission's proposal, formulate convincing legislative text, and facilitate compromises. The qualitative evidence from the NDICI negotiations suggest that representatives from countries highly committed to development, as evidenced by their level of ODA, often were understood as playing a leading role in these negotiations. For instance, several interviewees highlight the experience and expertise of the Swedish representative as conducive to her government's influence in the negotiations (Commission official 1; Commission official 2). Moreover, they underline that Sweden, due to its experience, had developed more precise positions on many issues than other member states.

As is typical for regression analysis, the illustrated results represent average associations. There are several exceptions of actors and issues that fit these average patterns less well. For example, in the case of the ODA factor, the general finding does not apply well to Denmark. The country has one of the highest ODA percentages in the EU, but did not see its policy preferences reflected in the final agreement to a great extent. Similarly, Slovenia, a new donor, has a low ODA percentage, but attained a relatively high average success score.

We also tested if variation in bargaining success was driven by countries' centrality in the diplomatic network of member states. States with greater access to information and possessing higher authority, skill, and expertise in the issues under negotiation tend to be viewed as attractive coalitional partners (Naurin 2007; Huhe et al. 2018). While many of the EU's larger countries have high

network capital, some smaller states outrank their larger peers in terms of network capital. For instance, medium-sized states like Sweden and the Netherlands rank higher than Italy and Spain (Naurin and Lindahl 2010). However, according to our tests, such network capital did not play a significant role in explaining bargaining success in the NDICI negotiations (Table A1 in the Appendix). We interpret these results as indicating that in these negotiations, policy-specific commitment and expertise were more important than the benefits that may flow from a being perceived as a useful coalitional partner in the general sense.

Expertise is also an important factor in explaining the influence of the Commission in these negotiations, according to interviewees. "The Commission will always get the long end of the stick because they have resources and expertise which member states lack," according to an official of the German Government. Similarly, a Finnish Government official affirms: "Given the level of technical and legal detail, the member states are quite reliant on the Commission."

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter suggests that bargaining success in the NDICI negotiation was driven primarily by a member state's commitment to development, its efforts to persuade other parties at the negotiating table, and its access to the office of the Presidency, rather than its overall structural power, voting strength, or general network capital.

First, a country's financial commitment to development is positively associated with bargaining success, consistent with the pattern that traditional Northern donors were particularly influential in the NDICI negotiations (Chapter 3). Countries that provide a larger portion of their incomes as ODA were more likely to be successful in these negotiations. These countries are particularly committed to development cooperation in political and financial terms, which

likely translates into greater credibility and weight at the negotiation table. Moreover, countries that are proportionally large donors have likely built up more relevant expertise in development, compared with smaller donors or countries that only recently got involved in development cooperation.

Second, a member state's level of engagement in the NDICI negotiations appears to have mattered for its ability to reach its preferred outcomes. When member states make greater efforts at persuading other parties by way of more statements in the negotiations, they also score more highly on bargaining success. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a country is more likely to rally support behind its position when taking the initiative and speaking more frequently on an issue to convince others of the merits of its case.

Third, those countries that held the rotating Presidency during the course of the NDICI negotiations were better able to shape the agreement in line with their preferences. While it is sometimes asserted that Presidencies are forced to "sacrifice" their interests for the greater good of reaching compromises, the NDICI negotiations instead point to the advantages associated with this office. In particular, Presidencies may enjoy leeway to shape negotiated outcomes by way of their position as negotiator of the Council vis-à-vis the Parliament.

Fourth, several commonly highlighted sources of influence appear not to have shaped member states' bargaining success in the NDICI negotiations. Most importantly, bargaining success in these negotiations does not seem to have been driven by structural power, as measured by member states' economic size and population size. Similarly, member states' voting power in the Council, closely correlated to economic and population size, did not matter for the distribution of bargaining success. Neither did these analyses yield support for a country's network capital: member states more appreciated as coalition partners in EU politics overall were not better able to reach their preferred outcomes.

5 Conclusion

NDICI-Global Europe presents a significant overhaul of the EU's architecture for the European neighbourhood, development policy, and international cooperation, integrating multiple programs into one framework with a total budget of around €80 billion over the period 2021–2027. The adoption of the new instrument in June 2021 followed three years of intense negotiations among the member states in the Council and between the EU institutions. These negotiations present a unique opportunity to gain insight into the dynamics shaping the orientation of EU development cooperation.

To that end, we have explored three core themes in this report, building on unique data from the 99 meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Party on NDICI. First, we have mapped the positions taken by EU member states and institutions on the issues negotiated as part of the NDICI package, identifying coalitions of likeminded actors. Second, we have assessed the bargaining success of EU member states and institutions in these negotiations, overall and on specific issues. Finally, we have analysed the sources of influence that have contributed to these patterns of bargaining success in the NDICI negotiations. While the analyses of the report cover all EU member states, we have devoted special attention to the role of Sweden in the negotiation of NDICI.

We judge the likelihood that our findings would be systematically affected by bias to be limited, for reasons laid out in the introduction. Our coding of country positions was validated by five external experts with excellent insight into the NDICI negotiations. Swedish officials reporting from the meetings should have no incentives to falsely convey the positions of other member states to the MFA, since those positions are used to formulate Swedish bargaining strategies. The Swedish reports from the 99 meetings are time stamped, eliminating the possibility that the recorded positions could have been adjusted retroactively to fit the ultimate outcomes. And

the findings from this report in several respects match results from other research on EU negotiations and development cooperation, lending them further credibility.

5.1 Summary of findings

The report presents four principal findings:

1. *Member states were varyingly engaged in the negotiations on NDICI.* Some member states were particularly active, taking positions on most issues of negotiation: Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands. This group includes several small or medium-sized countries traditionally belonging to the group of ambitious donors. The analysis indicates a strong, positive relationship between a country's financial commitment to development and position-taking in the negotiations. Sweden fits this pattern well, being the most generous donor and one of the countries with most positions in the negotiations. Similar patterns emerge when analysing the number of position statements made by member states in the negotiations as well as the order in which positions were expressed. Least engaged in the negotiations across several measures were Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania. Overall, the countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later are well-represented among those member states taking a less active role in the negotiations.
2. *Member states were divided along two key dimensions of conflict in the negotiations.* The first dimension captured issues of distribution, such as whether to prioritize LDCs or MICs and whether to make poverty eradication the primary objective. The second dimension captured issues of value conflict, such as whether to include goals related to climate, migration, and gender. Member states took varying positions on these two dimensions, leading to distinct groups of likeminded countries. Sweden belonged to the group of countries that advocated more resources to LDCs and poverty eradication, and that also held progressive positions

on issues related to climate, migration, and gender. Across all issues in the NDICI negotiations, the member states that tended to be closest to the positions of Sweden were Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Conversely, the member states that tended to be furthest away from the positions of Sweden were Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.

3. *Bargaining success in the negotiations was relatively evenly distributed across member states and EU institutions.* No state or supranational actor emerged as a distinct winner or loser in these negotiations taken as a whole. However, within this larger compromise, there were some identifiable differences between categories of member states. On average, traditional donors in Northern Europe were more successful in attaining their preferences. Conversely, most Eastern European countries had relatively low bargaining success. Neither of the EU's two dominant member states – France and Germany – scored very high in terms of bargaining success, but it cannot be excluded that they exerted additional influence by shaping the Commission's proposal before it was tabled. Similarly, both the Commission and the Parliament scored average bargaining success. Sweden ranks among the most successful countries in the NDICI negotiations, especially when we take the salience of issues into account. Sweden scored important victories on several issues it had identified as priorities going into the negotiation, including legislation relating to gender equality and poverty eradication.

4. *Bargaining success in the NDICI negotiations was driven primarily by a member state's commitment to development, its efforts to persuade other parties at the negotiating table, and its access to the office of the Presidency.* Countries that provide a larger portion of their incomes as ODA managed to translate this financial commitment into greater weight at the negotiation table. In addition, member states that made greater efforts at persuading other parties by being more engaged in the negotiations were also more successful in attaining their objectives. Finally, countries holding the rotating Presidency during the NDICI negotiations profited from this

position, which allowed them to put their particular imprint on the outcomes. Holding a centrist position or aligning with the Commission also translated into greater average success. In contrast, several commonly highlighted sources of influence were not of systematic importance in the NDICI negotiations: member states' structural power, in terms of economic and population size; member states' voting power in the Council; and member states' network capital, in terms of how appreciated they are as coalition partners in EU politics overall.

5.2 Policy implications

The findings of the report suggest a number of implications for how member states in general should navigate in negotiations on EU development cooperation. In addition, each of these implications involves particular lessons for Sweden. These implications are of particular importance in view of the upcoming mid-term review of NDICI, as well as the Swedish Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2023.

- *Be engaged by taking and advocating positions.* Taking positions on the issues of negotiation makes it possible to set the parameters of the negotiations, to shape the direction of the deliberations, to join forces with likeminded parties, and to create opportunities for compromises and exchanges. Similarly, being engaged over the course of the negotiations by making repeated statements helps to signal the importance of this issue to a member state, to persuade other parties of the value of a position, and to make sure that one's interests are considered in the resolution of this issue. In contrast, not developing and advocating a position amounts to political walk-over.

  For Sweden, being active and engaged was an important source of influence in the NDICI negotiations, pointing to the benefits of this approach going forward. Sweden was among the top six member states in terms of position adoption, and it was second

only to France in terms of position statements in the negotiations. While it is generally more demanding for a small or medium-sized state like Sweden to develop the expertise and resources necessary to be engaged across a broad range of issues, such investments pay off in negotiations.

- *Build coalitions with likeminded states and institutions.* By joining forces in coalitions, member states can pool bargaining power and achieve outcomes that are more favourable than what could have been achieved by each state individually. In most EU negotiations, it is a matter of building a winning majority behind a proposal or a blocking minority against a proposal. While belonging to institutionalized coalitions has its advantages, it is crucial to recognize that state preferences tend to be issue-specific and thus demand flexibility in the building of likeminded coalitions. As evidenced by the NDICI negotiations, broad and general dimensions of conflict between groups of member states often coexist with more unique alignments on specific issues.

  For Sweden, the NDICI negotiations pointed to a principal group of likeminded countries, whose positions aligned with those of Sweden on most issues: Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg. The countries in this group of large and established Northern donors tend to advocate prioritizing LDCs and poverty eradication, as well as progressive positions on climate, gender, and migration. It is notable that this group is broader than Sweden's conventional Nordic partners on development cooperation, suggesting new important likeminded partners. Beyond this group, there are several countries that align with Sweden on specific issues, suggesting possibilities for non-conventional coalitions. In addition, Sweden has much to benefit from cooperating with the Commission and the Parliament on such geographic and thematic issues, where the supranational institutions hold preferences very close to Sweden's, while the situation is different on budgetary and, especially, governance issues.

- *Gain influence through issue-specific power.* While structural power assumes a prominent role in public discourse about state influence, it rarely comes out strongly in academic analyses of bargaining success. Instead, as shown by the NDICI negotiations, countries often gain influence by way of their issue-specific power – their commitment to, experience of, and expertise within a particular policy domain. In the case of NDICI, member states' financial commitment to development cooperation translated into influence at the bargaining table. Countries that invest more in development relative to their economy, and have developed greater expertise in this area as a result, could reap the rewards of this commitment through greater bargaining success.

  For Sweden, these findings are good news, since Sweden and other small or medium-sized countries possess limited structural power but may gain influence by developing and deploying their issue-specific power. As one of several Northern donor countries with weak structural power but a strong commitment to development, Sweden was able to punch above their weight in the NDICI negotiations. In this context, the expertise brought to the table by the Swedish government in general, and its working party representative in particular, was frequently cited as a source of influence. And while Sweden belonged to the group of fiscally cautious member states in the overall negotiations on the EU's new long-term budget, this position does not appear to have hampered its ability to shape the direction of NDICI.

- *Acknowledge the Presidency as a source of power.* While it is often stated that countries holding the rotating Presidency need to sacrifice their own interests for the greater good, such descriptions underestimate the potential for Presidencies to shape agendas and outcomes. As shown in the NDICI negotiations, countries holding the Presidency have access to procedural and informational resources that may allow them to stitch together compromises on contentious issues, while also exerting special

influence over the conditions. In particular, the Presidency enjoys some leeway to shape agreements because of its position as the Council's representative in relation to the Parliament. Exploiting that room for manoeuvre to nudge compromises in a particular direction seldom causes celebration but is an accepted part of a system in which each member state needs to make its imprint on EU politics during its period at the helm.

For Sweden, which assumes the Presidency on January 1, 2023, the NDICI negotiations underline the role the Presidency may have, not only in developing EU wide compromises on development policy, but also in shaping the terms of those compromises. While the strategic orientation of EU development cooperation has been set by the agreement on NDICI-Global Europe in 2021, the Swedish Presidency may have a role to play in the Council's work to oversee the implementation of this extensive policy package. As Presidency, Sweden may gain additional credibility from its financial commitment and prior expertise in the area of development cooperation.

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Appendix

Section A1. Coding of source material

The coding aims to capture the influence of European Union institutions and Member States for a range of contested policy issues negotiated as part of the NDICI. The coding relates to contested policy issues and actor preferences as discussed in the Council Ad Hoc Working Party on the NDICI, in combination with the proposed and final versions of the NDICI regulation text. The specific policy issues, and positions for each policy issue, are derived from MFA meeting documentation and legislative text. The findings are validated through interviews with external experts, including officials from European Union institutions and member states.

Based on a qualitative assessment, issues are categorized as mainly concerning one of the five main areas of NDICI, including its three main pillars (geographic, thematic, rapid response pillar), governance issues, and other budgetary issues:

- GEO: Geographic pillar
- THEM: Thematic pillar
- RAP: Rapid response pillar
- GOV: Governance
- BUDG: Other budgetary issues

Within each of the five categories, policy issues are also numbered, starting from 1, to construct a unique issue identifier code, e.g., GOV1 and THEM12. A full list of issues is provided in Table A1 below.

Coding of positions. For each issue, we identify positions that are identified in the material. These positions reflect the positions voiced by member states and EU institutions during the negotiations, as well as the final outcome of the regulation text.

At least two conflicting positions are identified for each policy issue. All positions identified are held by at least one actor or by the final regulation text. All positions identified for a policy issue are formulated in a mutually exclusive manner.

All positions assume a value ranging from 0 to 100. If only two conflicting positions exist, they take on the values 0 and 100 respectively. If more than two conflicting positions exist, they take on a value that reflects the actual distance between the positions, based on a qualitative judgment.

Examples:

- Two conflicting positions exist regarding whether to include a certain policy area in the NDICI. The position "no" assumes value 0, position "yes" assumes value 100.
- Three conflicting positions exist that are in favour of earmarking 0 percent, 10 percent and 50 percent respectively to a certain policy area. In this example, the three positions take on the values 0, 20 and 100 respectively.

Positioning variables used in the coding stage. The following variables were recorded during the coding stage:

PosStart: Indicates the first position expressed by an actor on a specific policy issue. The variable allows the data set to capture the starting position of an actor when the actor expresses more than one position throughout the negotiations. As it identifies actor positioning, the possible values of the variable range from 0 to 100.

PosEnd: Indicates the final position expressed by an actor on a specific policy issue. The variable allows the data set to capture the ending position of an actor when the actor expresses more than one

position throughout the negotiations. As it identifies actor positioning, the possible values of the variable range from 0 to 100.

Order: Marks the chronological order in which actors express their starting positions on an issue (i.e., from first to last). The first actor to express a position on each issue receives the value 1, the second actor to express a position receives value 2, and so on. If two actors express their position within the same meeting, the actors receive the same value. Subsequently, the next actor to express a position receives a value that represents their order in the turn of actors that have expressed a position, rather than the directly following value. Example: Actors A, B and C express their position in the first meeting, thus all receiving the value 1. Actor D expresses a position in the next following meeting, receiving the value 4.

Mentions: Captures the number of meetings in which an actor has expressed a position on a particular policy issue.

Outcome: Indicates the final outcome of each policy issue, as identified in the final Regulation (EU) 2021/947 establishing the NDICI. As it relates to the possible positions for each policy issue, the values of the variable range from 0 to 100.

SwePrio: Provides an assessment of the level of priority attributed to each contested issue by Sweden. The priority assessment is based on the analysed material, including meeting instructions and reports from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as well as validation interviews with Swedish officials. The variable takes on a value between 1 and 5 where each value represents the level of priority according to the following scale:

1. Very low priority
2. Low priority
3. Medium priority
4. High priority
5. Very high priority

General coding principles. The below summarizes general coding principles that provided guidance throughout the coding process. The principles determined how the hand coding of the material was performed and established guidelines to ensure uniform coding choices across policy issues and throughout the coding process.

Positions voiced by an actor should be coded in the following situations:

- When an actor explicitly states an opinion that corresponds to one of the positions identified for a particular policy issue.
- When an actor expresses clear agreement or disagreement with a position previously expressed by another actor, in which case a position is coded both for the actor who originally expressed the position and all actors who subsequently express clear agreement or disagreement with that position. However, note that disagreement should only be coded as the opposing position when there are only two binary positioning options available, i.e., one position in favour and one against a certain policy choice.
- When an actor expresses both a primary and a secondary position, i.e., one preferred position and one alternative position, only the primary or preferred position should be coded. Likewise, if an actor promotes a secondary position in meeting discussions, for example by giving support to the statement of another actor, but later returns to stating another primary or otherwise preferred position, the latter position should be coded.

Positions voiced by an actor should *not* be coded in the following situations:

- When it corresponds to more than one of the alternative positions for an issue, or when it is not clear that the position expressed by the actor corresponds to the same aspect or contestation of the policy issue as it is formulated in the code book.

- When an actor opposes another position, but does not clearly state which out of several other positions they advocate. However, in a situation with only two binary positions (i.e., one position in favour and one against a certain policy choice), this is coded as the opposing position if it is clear that there is only one alternative to the positioning option discussed.
- When an actor submits a 'review reservation' [Swedish: granskningsreservation] during the negotiations of a specific policy issue, as it is not a clear expression of a position.

Coding rules for specific recurring wording and phrases:

- "The Member State expressed concern for this proposal/option/alternative".
- "The Member State saw no advantages with this option". Code as opposing the position expressed prior to it in the negotiations if it is clear that the position held relates to only one of the alternative coding positions, i.e., if there are only two alternative positions.
- "The Member State expressed a similar opinion/similar views". Code as the same position as that previously stated, i.e., the position which the concerned Member State expresses a similar opinion to.
- "The Member State makes a reservation against this proposal". Code as a position against the proposal or position being discussed.

Coding of compromises and other shifts in actor positions:

- When the positions of an actor changes within a meeting, typically as a result of a compromise being reached within the meeting, code the position of the actors concerned as the position that is adopted following the compromise, i.e., the new position that is the outcome of the meeting.

- However, it should be ensured that the original position of the actors concerned by the compromise, or other reason for changed actor positions, has been captured in a previous meeting. If the original position of an actor (i.e., the pre-compromise position) is not captured in an earlier meeting, code the original position as the actor's position for the meeting where the shift takes place.

Addition of new alternative positions during the coding process:

- If no existing positioning option for a concerned policy issue corresponds to a position voiced by an actor in the negotiations, a new position is added. However, when a new position is added, it should ensure that mutual exclusivity between positions is maintained.
- When a new position is presented in a later stage of the negotiations that does not directly correspond to the positions previously voiced, for example due to discrepancy regarding the level of detail or the partial overlap with existing positions, the new position should initially be coded without changing or removing positions previously coded for the same policy issue. Rather, capture both sets of alternative positions in order to maintain traceability for the coding of the positions, to instead be separated or merged in a later stage of the coding process.

Section A2. Data comments

We optimized the quality and credibility of our analysis by making the following changes to the sample:

- EIB and EBRD were excluded from the sample; they only adopted positions on 1 issue each.
- The UK is excluded as it left the EU during the negotiation of NDICI.

- Principal component analyses are performed on a sample of issues with a minimum of 15 adopted positions.
- Actors that adopted positions on fewer than 15 out of 55 issues are excluded from the analysis of weighted bargaining success.

Table A1. Negotiated issues'

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
Governance	GOV1	Delegated acts	The extent to which the NDICI should make use of delegated acts to supplement or amend certain elements of the regulation, and other related factors concerning the inter-institutional power balance in the NDICI.
	GOV2	Member states' strategic influence	The extent and forums through which the Member States' strategic influence in the governance of NDICI should be exercised, including contestation on the use of comitology and other separate forums and means for Member States' strategic governance of the Instrument.
	GOV3	European preference	Whether to include language on a European preference relating to implementing partners, goods and/or as a general principle of the Regulation. (Financial institutions, i.e., a preference for the European Investment Bank and/or other European finance institutions are not taken into account in this issue.)
	GOV4	The scope of the incentive-based approach	Whether the incentive-based approach, established in Article 20 of the final NDICI regulation, should apply only to the Neighbourhood or as a principle for financial allocation beyond the Neighbourhood.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	GOV5	Inclusiveness	Preferred language on inclusiveness and requirements of prior development experience in the regulation text. Whether inclusiveness and collaboration in the implementation of development cooperation and external action policies should be limited to partners with prior experience.
	GOV6	Suspension mechanism	Whether to include a suspension mechanism in the regulation to enable the possibility to suspend assistance, e.g., in the event of degradation in democracy, human rights or the rule of law in third countries.
	GOV7	The role of the EIB	The role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the NDICI. Whether financing under the NDICI should be carried out through an open financing architecture, or with dedicated or exclusive funding windows for the EIB, or through a continued external lending mandate to the EIB.
	GOV8	Article 208 TFEU as legal basis	Whether to include a reference to Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which refers to the reduction and eradication of poverty as the primary objective of EU development cooperation policy, as legal basis for the NDICI regulation.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	GOV9	Monitoring and evaluation	Whether the evaluation of the Instrument should be carried out, in part, through a compulsory midterm review or interim evaluation by the Commission.
	GOV10	Key performance indicators	The use of key performance indicators (KPI) to help measure the contributions of the Instrument. Whether and to what extent KPI should be used for measuring the achievement of the specific objectives of the NDICI.
Geographic	GEO1	Allocation for geographic pillar	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the geographic pillar.
	GEO2	The Neighbourhood	Whether to integrate the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) into the NDICI or whether the ENI should remain a separate instrument outside the NDICI.
	GEO3	The Neighbourhood	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the geographic programme for the Neighbourhood.
	GEO4	The Neighbourhood	Whether to maintain the funding balance between the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood (1/3 to the Eastern Neighbourhood and 2/3 to the Southern Neighbourhood as established by the "Gentlemen's Agreement") or to change the funding balance by earmarking or increasing the funding to one part of the Neighbourhood.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	GEO5	The Neighbourhood	Whether 10% of the financial envelope towards the Neighbourhood should be allocated to partner countries on the basis of an incentive-based or a performance-based approach, i.e., the preferred heading and wording in Article 20 of the final regulation.
	GEO6	The Neighbourhood	How much of the financial envelope for the Neighbourhood area that should be indicatively allocated to support cross-border cooperation programmes.
	GEO7	The Neighbourhood	Whether to earmark, or any other way of codifying, the balance in Neighbourhood funding towards the Eastern and the Southern Neighbourhood respectively.
	GEO8	Sub-Saharan Africa	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the geographic programme for Sub-Saharan Africa.
	GEO9	Sub-Saharan Africa	Whether to include a reference to a Pan-African or continental approach to Africa, or a Pan-African programme or funding window in the Instrument.
	GEO10	Asia and the Pacific	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the geographic programme for Asia and the Pacific.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	GEO11	Asia and the Pacific	Whether to introduce a separate reference and/or earmarking to the sub-region Central Asia within the Instrument.
	GEO12	Americas and the Caribbean	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the geographic programme for the Americas and the Caribbean.
	GEO13	Priority between LDCs and MICs	The prioritization and balance between Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Middle-Income Countries (MICs) in the Instrument. Whether to establish a clear priority to LDC, including specific references and funding targets to LDC, a less strong priority to LDC, including some references to LDC and the different nature of support to MIC, or an increased priority to MIC, including additional references or funding targets to MIC.
	GEO14	Earmarking for Erasmus+	Whether to include an indicative earmarking for Erasmus+ in the Instrument, or a reference to the possibility to finance actions under Erasmus+ through NDICI in a recital.
Thematic	THEM1	Allocation for thematic pillar	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the thematic pillar.
	THEM2	Migration	How much of the total NDICI budget should be earmarked towards migration-related actions.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	THEM3	Migration	Whether the scope of funding for migration-related actions under the Instrument should be limited to migration management and governance or the root causes of migration, or whether the scope should include both areas of migration-related actions.
	THEM4	Migration	The use of migration as a criterion for incentive-based allocations or migration as a criterion for negative conditionality or suspension of funding.
	THEM5	Migration	Whether to include 'positive language' regarding migration and the development impact of migration in the NDICI regulation text.
	THEM6	Migration	Whether to include references to the Global Compact for Migration and/or the Global Compact on Refugees, or similar references but in other wording.
	THEM7	Migration	Whether the funding target or earmarking for migration should be placed in a recital or in an article of the regulation.
	THEM8	Migration	Whether the Instrument should include migration as a separate heading under the thematic programmes.
	THEM9	Migration	Whether to establish a 'migration facility' or 'migration coordination mechanism' under the Instrument.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	THEM10	Climate	How much of the total NDICI budget should be earmarked towards climate-related actions.
	THEM11	Climate	Whether the funding target or earmarking for climate should be placed in a recital or in an article of the regulation.
	THEM12	Civil society organizations programme	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the thematic programme for Civil Society Organisations.
	THEM13	Civil society organizations programme	Whether to include references and/or a separate program, earmarking or budget post for local authorities within the Instrument.
	THEM14	Human Rights and Democracy programme	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the thematic programme for Human Rights and Democracy.
	THEM15	Human Rights and Democracy programme	In which wording to include references for election observation missions, and whether to include an earmarking specifically for election observation missions within the Instrument.
	THEM16	Stability and Peace programme	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the thematic programme for Stability and Peace.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	THEM17	Global Challenges programme	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of the thematic programme for Global Challenges.
	THEM18	Gender equality	Whether and in which wording to include language on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) in the Instrument.
	THEM19	Gender equality	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI that should be marked with the OECD-DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker (G-marker) I or II.
	THEM20	Gender equality	Whether to include a separate thematic heading for gender equality under the thematic programmes.
	THEM21	Nuclear safety	Whether to include references to nuclear safety in the regulation text.
Rapid response	RAP1	Allocation for rapid response	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of rapid response actions.
Budgetary	BUDG1	Financial targets and funding levels	The total level of funds allocated under the Instrument.
	BUDG2	Financial targets and funding levels	Whether to earmark sub-headings and priorities, other than the programmes listed in Article 6, e.g., migration or climate, in the recitals or articles of the Regulation.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	BUDG3	Financial targets and funding levels	The thresholds for action plans and measures for which the Commission can make decisions *without* the requirement of an implementing act, as regulated in Article 25 a, b and c respectively in the final regulation text.
	BUDG4	The inclusion of EDF	Whether to budgetise the European Development Fund in the NDICI, or let it remain a separate instrument.
	BUDG5	The inclusion of EFSD+	Whether to include the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) in the NDICI, or let it remain a separate instrument.
	BUDG6	ODA	How much of the total funding under the Instrument that should fulfil the criteria for ODA as established by the OECD-DAC, i.e., the total 'ODA level' of the NDICI.
	BUDG7	ODA	Where in the regulation to place a reference to the Union collective target of reaching between 0,15 and 0,2% of the Union gross national income as ODA to LDCs in the short term and 0,2% within the timeframe of the 2030 Agenda.
	BUDG8	Emerging challenges and priorities cushion	How much of the total allocation of funds under the NDICI should go towards the funding of an emerging challenges and priorities cushion, as set out in Article 6(3) of the final regulation text.

Cluster	Code	Issue	Description
	BUDG9	Financial flexibility tools	To which extent to include financial flexibility tools in the NDICI, e.g., establishing rules regarding carry-overs of unused commitment and payment appropriations, annual instalments, re-payments and revenues generated by a financial instrument and budgetary guarantees, and other financial flexibility tools or exceptions from the Financial Regulation.

Table A2. Swedish priorities

Issue code	Issue	Estimated Swedish priority
GOV1	Delegated acts	High
GOV2	Member states' strategic influence	High
GOV3	European preference	Very high
GOV4	The scope of the incentive-based approach	High
GOV5	Inclusiveness	Medium
GOV6	Suspension mechanism	Low
GOV7	The role of the EIB	High
GOV8	Article 208 TFEU as legal basis	High
GOV9	Monitoring and evaluation	Low
GOV10	Key performance indicators	High
GEO1	Allocation for geographic pillar	High
GEO2	The Neighbourhood	High
GEO3	The Neighbourhood	High
GEO4	The Neighbourhood	Very high
GEO5	The Neighbourhood	Very high
GEO6	The Neighbourhood	Low
GEO7	The Neighbourhood	High
GEO8	Sub-Saharan Africa	Medium
GEO9	Sub-Saharan Africa	Very low
GEO10	Asia and the Pacific	Medium
GEO11	Asia and the Pacific	Very low
GEO12	Americas and the Caribbean	Medium
GEO13	Priority between LDCs and MICs	Very high
GEO14	Earmarking for Erasmus+	Low
THEM1	Allocation for thematic pillar	High
THEM2	Migration	High
THEM3	Migration	Very high
THEM4	Migration	Very high

Issue code	Issue	Estimated Swedish priority
THEM5	Migration	Very high
THEM6	Migration	Medium
THEM7	Migration	High
THEM8	Migration	Low
THEM9	Migration	High
THEM10	Climate	Very high
THEM11	Climate	High
THEM12	Civil society organizations programme	High
THEM13	Civil society organizations programme	Low
THEM14	Human Rights and Democracy programme	High
THEM15	Human Rights and Democracy programme	Medium
THEM16	Stability and Peace programme	Medium
THEM17	Global Challenges programme	Medium
THEM18	Gender equality	Very high
THEM19	Gender equality	Very high
THEM20	Gender equality	High
THEM21	Nuclear safety	Very low
RAP1	Allocation for rapid response	High
BUDG1	Financial targets and funding levels	Very high
BUDG2	Financial targets and funding levels	High
BUDG3	Financial targets and funding levels	High
BUDG4	The inclusion of EDF	Medium
BUDG5	The inclusion of EFSD+	Medium
BUDG6	ODA	Very high
BUDG7	ODA	Very high
BUDG8	Emerging challenges and priorities cushion	Low
BUDG9	Financial flexibility tools	Very high

Table A3. Actor codes

Actor	Actor code
Austria	AT
Belgium	BE
Bulgaria	BG
Croatia	HR
Cyprus	CY
Czech Republic	CZ
Denmark	DK
Estonia	EE
Finland	FI
France	FR
Germany	DE
Greece	EL
Hungary	HU
Ireland	IE
Italy	IT
Latvia	LV
Lithuania	LT
Luxembourg	LU
Malta	MT
Netherlands	NL
Poland	PL
Portugal	PT
Romania	RO
Slovakia	SK
Slovenia	SI
Spain	ES
Sweden	SE
Commission	COM
European Parliament	EP

Table A4. Multi-level models of bargaining success (positions clustered in issues)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Unweighted success	Unweighted success	Weighted success	Weighted success	Binary success	Binary success
(Intercept)	54.66 ***	55.24 ***	14.63 ***	14.96 ***	0.26 ***	0.27 ***
	(2.87)	(2.78)	(1.99)	(2.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Order	5.64 ***	5.29 ***	4.86 ***	4.72 ***	0.07 ***	0.07 ***
	(1.42)	(1.46)	(0.71)	(0.74)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Position statements	3.05	2.77	3.27 ***	3.18 ***	0.04 *	0.04 *
	(1.57)	(1.64)	(0.79)	(0.83)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Extremity	-14.50 ***	-15.00 ***	-3.76 ***	-3.92 ***	-0.12 ***	-0.12 ***
	(1.62)	(1.66)	(0.83)	(0.86)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Council Votes	-0.22	1.43	-0.33	0.13	-0.01	0.00
	(1.17)	(1.85)	(0.56)	(0.89)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Presidency	18.10	35.03 *	12.65 *	21.21 **	0.07	0.38 *
	(10.50)	(14.23)	(5.09)	(6.87)	(0.11)	(0.15)
COM coalition	18.83 ***	17.78 ***	12.22 ***	11.73 ***	0.30 ***	0.28 ***
	(2.89)	(2.99)	(1.44)	(1.50)	(0.03)	(0.03)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Unweighted success	Unweighted success	Weighted success	Weighted success	Binary success	Binary success
ODA	2.96 *	3.83 *	1.55 **	1.74 *	0.03 *	0.04 *
	(1.21)	(1.53)	(0.59)	(0.74)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Network capital		-2.75		-0.85		-0.02
		(2.02)		(0.97)		(0.02)
N	706	655	706	655	706	655
N (Issue)	52	52	52	52	52	52
AIC	6878.96	6387.11	5902.38	5486.92	611.27	596.89
BIC	6924.55	6436.44	5947.97	5536.25	656.87	646.23
R^2 (fixed)	0.23	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.17
R^2 (total)	0.40	0.39	0.54	0.54	0.60	0.59

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Figure A1. Number of positions per issue



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In 2021 a new long-term EU budget (2021–2027) was decided. An important part of the budget is the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), which covers EU development cooperation with most third countries. This report provides a unique insight into the negotiations. All positions presented by the Member States throughout the negotiations are described. The authors then show how those positions translated into the end results of the negotiation – thus how successful, or influential, Member States have been.

År 2021 beslutades en ny långsiktig EU-budget för åren 2021–2027. En viktig del av budgeten är Instrumentet för grannskap, utveckling och internationellt samarbete (NDICI), som reglerar EU:s utvecklingssamarbete. Den här rapporten ger en unik inblick i förhandlingarna. Alla ståndpunkter som lagts fram av medlemsstaterna under förhandlingarna beskrivs. Författarna visar sedan hur dessa ståndpunkter översattes till slutresultatet av förhandlingen – alltså hur framgångsrika, eller inflytelserika, olika medlemsstater har varit.

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The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) is a government committee with a mandate to independently analyse and evaluate Swedish international development aid.